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This dissertation explores transnational security provisioning on/for the internet. A unique 
framework of analysis is established that melds traditional understandings of security drawn from 
computing disciplines with levels of analysis from international relations (IR) theory. This helps 
bridge the gap between IR security literatures that often places the State at the center of analysis 
with the system of distributed agency often called a “patchwork” that underlies security 
provisioning on/for the Internet.  This results in the Information Centered IR Security Model 
(ICIRS pronounced Icarus).  The recognition and remediation of large-scale issues on/for the 
Internet is shown to be a form of social practice which has instantiated a community of practice.  
Data across cases of malware recognition and remediation are used to establish a historical context 
for the provisioning of security on/for the Internet and to analyze the modern provisioning context.  
It is concluded that an information security community of practice has arisen as consequence of 
the Internet’s early structure while evolving through various important security events.  That 
community is embedded within the functional structure of the Internet and, through the 
maintenance of professional social relations, individuals within the community can act both as 
sensors to recognize emerging threats and as agents to remediate such threats thus wielding an 








CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Nation-states have acknowledged cyber-space as a medium of strategic focus and 
equivalent of air, land, sea, and space.  A review of capstone strategy documents across NATO 
countries and other world powers support that conclusion and show that government centered 
initiatives often dominate discussion while also often espousing a desire to operate with impunity 
within the cyber realm (though not often stated in such stark terms).1  Ostensibly, elevating the 
cyber environment to stand next to the four other strategic domains signals that security within 
cyber-space is to be pursued with equal vigor if such statements are taken at face value.  This 
represents a paradox for national governments that must advance their interests and power within 
a strategic domain that relies on many private and non-domestic elements for both function and 
security while falling outside of exclusive control by any one State apparatus.2 
 Analysts and practitioners have not reached as singular definition of what the cyber realm 
                                                          
1 See for example the list maintained by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of 
Excellence at https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-security-strategy-documents.html; and specific strategic 
documents such as the 2015 National Security Strategy of the US available at 
http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf. China, too, has elevated cyberspace 
to stand next to the other warfighting domains. For a summary of Chinese views see, the 26 
April 2016 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2016 issued by the US Office of the Secretary of Defense available 
at: https://www.defense.gov; specifically page 43 
2 This reliance on non-state centered elements for both function and security is what separates 
the Internet from other international ‘commons’. Air, land, sea, and space all exist independent 
of any private entity. The Internet, however, is non-constituent and cannot exist in a useful form 
unless transnational private, public, and quasi-public networks are joined together and traversed. 
Additionally, the argument is being made here that unlike the four other strategic spaces, Internet 
wide network security cannot be imposed simply through the elements of hard state power such 
as tanks, airplanes, and ships but is, in fact, contingent upon collaboration between many 
constituent entities and elements. This means, while states may conceive of ‘cyberspace’ 





consists of, but the Internet itself can be viewed as a large (if not the largest) component of that 
space.  Thereby, I argue it is necessary to understand the basic mechanisms of security that keep 
the Internet functional and remediate large-scale threats as they present themselves.  That 
infrastructure is commonly characterized as a “patchwork,” necessarily drawing on a diverse range 
of public agencies (civilian, military, and law enforcement), private entities, non-profit 
organizations, and academic institutions all falling across both domestic and international lines for 
response to large-scale events.  Network security on/for the Internet involves multiple stake-
holders and pervasive collaboration across many levels of structure and institutionalization that 
have resulted in a system of distributed agency.  This is partially due to how the Internet is 
engineered as a network of networks, parts of which are owned and operated by a variety both 
private, public, and hybrid entities that cross political boundaries.  What are the specific 
constituencies involved and how did those elements arise?  Much of the prior work with regard to 
Internet security has focused on an abstract understanding of those elements, but this dissertation 
helps illuminate the individual level of analysis with regard to the patchwork response system 
while also defining an important aspect of power in the connected world, the ability to recognize 
and remediate threats on the Internet.  That power is a product of where individuals are embedded 
within the connected infrastructure making up the Internet and when combined with the socio-
professional connections these individuals maintain, they may act as sensors to recognize threats 
and as agents to help remediate those same threats. 
 In terms of international relations (IR) theory, traditional concepts of security, most of 
which are “state-centered” in nature, are ill-suited to fully conceptualize, operationalize and 
explore the diverse nexus of actors, governance structures, formal, and informal communities 




dissertation argues that the recognition of threat, and the provisioning of security across a certain 
class of large-scale threats present on the Internet represent a set of practices, which take place 
within a community of practice.  The lens of practice can bridge the conceptual gap between 
traditional security understood to be a central responsibility of the State and the mechanism of 
distributed agency that underlies security on and for the Internet.  In order to do so, this dissertation 
creates a unique model that fuses traditional understandings of information security developed 
within the discipline of computing with foundational levels of analysis utilized within the 
discipline of International Relations.  The resultant model is applied to interrogate data on cases 
of botnet “takedowns” and malware remediation efforts.  In doing so, the present work fills both 
an empirical hole within the discussion of security pertinent to “cyberspace” while also providing 
theoretical bridges for the disciplines of IR and Security Studies to connect with and understand 
this important and understudied facet of the modern international security landscape.  Lastly, and 
importantly, this dissertation informs policy-making that seeks to advance both State and public 
interest while minimizing interference within the functioning system. 
1.1 Defining the Domain of Analysis 
 It is patently obvious that cyberspace has become a strategic security concept in and of 
itself.  Whether viewed as a constituent battle-space, a technological infrastructure, a socio-cultural 
concept, or an economic engine – information exchanged, stored and processed via electronic 
means and accessible through a variety of vectors to an international user-base has, for better or 
worse, become a central security concern for society at large.  It is unsurprising then, a community 
of individuals, private/public entities, and institutions aimed at the continued function of the 
Internet has manifested and continues to evolve.  Security and resiliency on and for the Internet is 




a mere function of pervasive connectivity.  Despite the existence of disincentives because of 
competitive pressures, secrecy necessitated by security concerns, lack of comprehensive formal 
arrangements, a plethora of threats, and many other potential road blocks -- the Internet continues 
to function, and collaborative security is still pursued.  The way this collaboration happens and the 
transnational coalitions that form to solve problems evolve present an interesting puzzle for those 
who study international security phenomena.  Information security communities of practice 
connect with each other across political borders, across civilian/military lines, and across public 
and private spheres to address both specific and diffuse threats -- be those threats malicious or 
structural in nature.  Sometimes these collaborations are born out of formal institutional linkages 
in a directed manner, but many other times informal collaboration instantiated through non-
hierarchical means is a central mechanism of threat redress.  
 This isn’t to say that computer security institutions and other represented entities represent 
some fanciful utopian community that simply does the right thing.  The reality is much more 
interesting.  Yet the degree, quality, and mechanisms of this collaboration are understudied facets 
of modern international life.  International relations theory has not, as of yet, explored this type of 
important collaborative security activity in a comprehensive manner.  
 The issue of collaborative security with regarding to the internet, while understudied, has 
been looked at narrowly by other authors.  This effort differs in the analytic approach used 
previously by varying both the theoretical lenses and levels of analysis applied.  Previous authors 




to within this work as “peer production.”3  This effort does not try and walk away from such a 
characterization but seeks to add a layer of analytic understanding by submitting that “peer 
production” cannot account for how current security provisioning is co-constituted, arising from 
both a technological and sociopolitical context beyond the narrow context peer production draws 
from.  Additionally, much of the current literature conceives of the security provisioning space as 
a network consisting of nodes that are far too homogeneous, thus abstracting away the institutions 
and hierarchies within which individuals and entities are embedded to the detriment of analytic 
utility.  The analysis presented herein is rooted in pragmatic approach, often stated as “problem” 
or “concept” oriented research methodology.  This perspective is not deductive or strictly 
inductive, instead it occupies a middle ground sometimes referred to as abduction.4  The process 
of abduction is not characterized by imposing an abstract theoretical template (deduction) from 
above or inferring propositions from facts (induction) but is characterized by reasoning at an 
intermediate level.5  The framework offered within the first two chapters of this work allows for a 
parsing of qualitative data to understand operational dynamics amongst security provisioning 
pathways in order to derive insight into that activity as a social practice.   
1.2 Descriptive Framework 
 The present analysis offers a framework within which to place the emergence and 
                                                          
3 Schmidt, Andreas. Secrecy versus openness: Internet security and the limits of open source and 
peer production Doctoral Thesis. Delft University, available at: 
http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid:ecf237ed-7131-4455-917f-11e55e03df0d/ 
4 The decision to use an abductive perspective is heavily influenced by literature such as:  
Friedrichs, Jörg, and Friedrich Kratochwil. "On acting and knowing: how pragmatism can 
advance international relations research and methodology. “International Organizationn 63.04 
(2009): 701-731; For a robust discussion on the merits of analytic eclecticism, see Sil, Rudra, 
and Peter J. Katzenstein. Beyond paradigms: analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 




continued evolution of Internet security provisioning activities.  It can be generally stated as 
follows: The success, qualified-success, and structure of international security provisioning 
activity on/for the Internet can be explained using the interplay of 1) the structure and 
interconnectedness of the Internet, 2) a local security culture specific to a problem and the 
individuals/entities whom first mobilize around it, and 3) interaction across ‘seams’ amongst 
constituencies brought together during the course of problem solving/ security provisioning.  The 
interplay of these three layers represent the context within which security provisioning exists as 
an embedded social practice.  The practice itself, while shaped by that context, also re-shapes the 
larger context and thus helps explain the evolution and structure of security provisioning. 
Often private companies will partner with government agencies in order to investigate and 
neutralize nefarious cyber actors.  This de facto deputation of private corporations acting on behalf 
of not just their own government, but on behalf of all Internet users, is a curious phenomenon as it 
speaks to a distribution of power and agency that is particularly hard to categorize. Partial 
explanations certainly revolve around the continued state of flux that the Internet’s governance 
regime is experiencing as it is still a young socio-political construct and technology by many 
measures.  Such an explanation is not, however, comprehensive enough to stand alone. There 
remain mechanisms of threat redress on and for the Internet that are only vaguely understood and 
have not yet been formally studied as a form of collaborative security executed among a diverse 
set of international private and public actors.  These forms of interaction are not easily placed 
within the traditional spectrum of international security behavior.   
This could be the case for a variety of reasons, amongst which are the vexing ambiguity 
and imprecision of the term “cyber-security”, the difficulty in segmenting and assessing the variety 




across civil/military, public/private, and domestic/international lines.  Additionally, there are few 
frame-works available, if any, on which to base analysis that can successfully conceptualize the 
information space alongside the trans-national political space that have also been widely accepted 
or applied.  Finally, these activities are not always ‘State centered’, meaning the principal entity 
initiating the security provisioning activity isn’t imbued with the authority of the State, the 
traditional holder of agency in international (and trans-national) security activity.  Often, parts of 
these communities of security professionals refer to themselves as the Internet operational security 
(OPSEC) community – indicating they view themselves as the operational security front line.  
Their communities are characterized by secrecy maintained through extensive peer vetting while 
shunning outsiders as participants on their mailing lists and web forums.  That secrecy makes 
empirical observation difficult but, in and of itself, indicates cultural institutionalization and the 
existence of elements of practice helping define the constituency as a “community”. 
Chapters one and two are meant to serve as an organizing tool and way out of the morass 
in order to better understand the evolving relationship between security communities of practice, 
outside institutions, and other involved entities with regards to the cyber-security.  Several guiding 
assumptions will be made before proceeding.  1) The definitional ambiguity of the term ‘cyber-
security’, while well worth discussing, cannot be solved here and will vary given institutional and 
regime context.  2) The overlapping, nested, and the otherwise complex relationship amongst cyber 
related institutions, regimes, bureaucracies, and normative milieu is larger than what can easily be 
mapped directly.  3) Existing frameworks related to security studies, international institutions, 
social theory, organizations, and collaboration can be leveraged to effectively explore and 




observation of ongoing and future dynamics may be difficult.6  First bridges will be built between 
traditional computational sciences’ understanding of security and the manner in which security is 
thought about within social science, specifically within the realm of security studies, a sub-
discipline of IR.  This will result in defining security for/on the Internet in the broadest and simplest 
terms possible while simultaneously avoiding the pervasive confusion and imprecision introduced 
by the term “cyber-security”.  Doing so is an exercise in ontological definition, helping bound the 
entity(s) under examination.  The second chapter will assemble a basis for analyzing security 
provisioning activities as an embedded social practice conceptualized as a network interacting 
across various functional boundaries termed seams.  The chapter will also critically and briefly 
assess work on the issue of collaborative Internet security emanating from other literatures such as 
Network Governance, Peer Production, Regime Complexes, and Science and Technology Studies, 
which are all adjacent to or complementary to the current effort.  These are reviewed to firmly seat 
the theoretical perspective within which this dissertation is placed.   
The third chapter of this dissertation will set the act of provisioning security on/for the 
Internet into a historical context alongside the evolution of the Internet bookended by two 
canonical cases, the Morris Worm incident and the Conficker botnet.  The chapter will also outline 
numerous events that help contextualize the rise of a security community of practice as the Internet 
exploded in size and importance and as security became a profession and central concern. 
Chapter four of this dissertation will analyze the modern provisioning space by first 
exploring the issue of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing errors, then by analyzing a specific 
segment of the Internet’s security community of practice centered on operational security and 
                                                          
6 The term inter-institutional is used here to refer to collaboration across (non-exhaustively) 




intelligence to understand identity.  Finally data gathered across numerous cases of malware and 
botnet remediation efforts that have taken place over the past twelve years will be used to help 
understand the phenomenon of modern “take-down” events when malware and botnets are 
neutralized by a constellation of actors and entities drawn from a community of practice.  
Chapter five of this dissertation uses the communities of practice framework to provide 
implications for institutional design questions faced by policy makers within the cyber-security 
policy arena.  The chapter will end by presenting a summary of findings, assess weaknesses with 
the argument being presented within this dissertation, and speaks to future work before offering 
concluding thoughts. 
1.3 Shifting Away from ‘Cyber’ and Defining Security 
Cyber-security as a term lacks a coherent or singular meaning.  This is an often-made 
observation within the burgeoning cyber focused literature emanating from the collective 
disciplines falling loosely under the rubric of International Studies.7  Writers usually follow that 
observation by a parsing of the term before a definition is offered that tries to bring clarity within 
the context of an author’s purpose.  While the present work is no different, the argument is made 
here that this definitional ambiguity cannot be solved due to a variety of normative and conceptual 
linkages the term gains when used within specific institutional context or in an area specific 
manner.  Admittedly, the argument for this substitution and idiomatic shift in terminology is not 
robustly developed here but, in short, shifting away from the term “cyber-security” toward an 
understanding of information security management helps address a fundamental, and perhaps 
                                                          
7 See for example, Valeriano, Brandon and Maness, Ryan C. International Relations Theory and 
Cybersecurity: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain in The Oxford Handbook 




widening, gap between technical computational/ IT security, policy discussion, and social science 
academic work.   
1.3.1 “Cyber” Doesn’t Exist (but it should) 
As a domain of knowledge, “cyber” is a poorly understood, emerging field composed of 
numerous asymmetric capabilities and concepts.  As a medium of action and value, “cyber” is 
constituent, non-material, and necessarily mediated by the established mediums of existence.  
Unlike other domains in modern human knowledge, the individual components do not form a 
coherent whole when understood from a technically-informed, inter-disciplinary viewpoint.  The 
pragmatic needs of various non-technical viewpoints to understand computer and network 
architecture and design are not served by the amorphous label “cyber” due to the occlusion of 
important technical details.  It is interesting to note anecdotally, in the technical community, 
“cyber” as a prefix can induce a negative connotation unless one is attempting to acquire funding 
and/or a grant and then it is merely distasteful.8  This is a two-fold problem: the technical 
community removes itself from the policy discussion and the policy community shrouds vital 
technical details from comprehension.  This dichotomous state of affairs is poisonous to successful 
“cyber” policy making.  In short, while the “cyber” moniker is clearly over-leveraged within the 
                                                          
8 Take for instance various posts on well-read sites within the technical community: Geigner, T. 
“If Most Crime Involves A 'Cyber' Element, Can't We Just Call It Crime Instead Of 
Cybercrime?” Techdirt., 5 Mar. 2013, www.techdirt.com/articles/20130304/06541422191/if-
most-crime-involves-cyber-element-cant-we-just-call-it-crime-instead-cybercrime.shtml.; 1 Aug 
2004 | 4:00 GMT, Paul McFedries. “The (Pre) Fix Is In.” IEEE Spectrum: Technology, 
Engineering, and Science News, 1 Aug. 2004, spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/education/the-pre-fix-
is-in.; For a less technical perspective from a more journalistic source see Yadron, Danny and 
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries. “This Article Was Written With the Help of a ‘Cyber’ Machine 
Overuse of prefix sparks a backlash, but alternatives are few; ‘computery’” The Wall Street 





policy and social science academic world, and is sometimes frowned on the technical world, it will 
become increasingly necessary for both worlds to forge a common understanding.   
The disconnect between social science and policy makers on one hand and the technical 
community on the other hand is wholly understandable.  Society has embraced the integration of 
computing into their daily lives; there remains and likely always will remain a gap between those 
who can be considered experts and aware of the security implications of computing architecture 
and the general public.  The concern with computer literacy has been a pervasive concern since 
the advent of personal computing, however despite that, by some measures progress has lagged. 9 
Both professional and non-professional use of computing remain replete with error-laden 
misunderstandings of the fundamental construction of computing systems and networks that 
manifest in varieties of confusion and imprecision during subsequent discussion and analysis. 
While not the subject of this dissertation, one need only look at the debates and discussions 
surrounding the application of deterrence theory to world of cyber-security.  Concepts such as 
“counter proliferation” and “transparency” have contested meanings and even more contested 
implications across an ever-widening field of literature that emanates from an ever more diverse 
range of interested computing, engineering, social science academic, policy interested 
constituencies, and many others.10 
                                                          
9 For historic context see: Seidel, Robert J., et al. Computer literacy: issues and directions for 
1985. Academic Press, 1985. 
10 See for example, authors such as Libicki who is skeptical that cyber war grand strategy can or 
should evolve due, in part, to the contested nature of the domain: Libicki, Martin. “Why Cyber 
War Will Not and Should Not Have Its Grand Strategist.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 
1, 2014, pp. 23–39., also see the various debates in:  National Research Council, et al. 
Proceedings of a workshop on deterring cyberattacks: informing strategies and developing 




Computer technology is utterly pervasive in modern societies.  Home users face a plethora 
of technical challenges in network and system configuration and administration due to the market 
in smart phones, tablets, network-aware entertainment devices, and personal computers. 
Lawmakers must legislate markets, and socio-political boundaries of permissible action regardless 
of their individual levels of specific domain knowledge in the fields of hardware architecture and 
software design.  Corporate users must utilize a variety of office productivity suites, enterprise 
resource planning systems, and internal operations tools.  Military users interact daily with a 
multitude of network-centric devices, many of which are not independent of more public networks.  
At all levels of modern society command and policy decisions must be made about the nature and 
disposition of information technology, yet there exists a pervasive lack of universal education in 
technical issues regarding IT systems.  For example, if you use the Advanced Placement tests given 
to US high school students to approximate undergraduate curriculum, AP Computer Science still 
lags far behind calculus as a technical subject of basic study (though that number is trending 
upward historically).11  This means technical knowledge of computing let alone robust technical 
understanding of security revolving around information technology is not universalized nor will it 
become so anytime soon.  Therefore, one can safely conclude the ambiguities surrounding the 
prefix “cyber” are not likely to converge on an easily understood, widely accepted, and applicable 
definition across technical and non-technical constituencies. 
That observation isn’t a critical assessment with negative intention, it is simply the natural 
state of affairs leading to the following conclusion: “Cyber” doesn’t exist as an easily identified 
domain drawing from a well understood ontology.  Instead the idea of a “cyberspace” and thus the 
                                                          





domain of “cyber-security” is contested and not easily disentangled from any number of context 
specific usages. 
1.4 Information Security Management 
To sidestep the debate over what “cyber-security” means, a substitution can be made to 
analyze “information security management” at various levels of analysis and abstraction.  The 
latter term being drawn from the computational and information technology disciplines and 
defined using the well-established McCumber Cube model of information security management.  
The model is often taught to students of information technology and computing to frame security 
along multiple dimensions of organizational foci.  Information is conceived as being in one of 
three stages: storage, processing, or transmission.  Each of these three stages is given an axis in 
the model’s representation.  In addition, information can be compromised in any combination of 
three ways defined by, confidentiality, integrity, and availability.12  The U.S. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) gives the following definitions of objectives for each 
dimension: 
• Confidentiality –“Preserving authorized restrictions on information access 
and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary 
information” 
• Integrity – “Guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity.” 
                                                          
12 Over the past two decades, this model has been firmly ensconced within computing security, 
however for a general overview of the model see: Maconachy, W. Victor, et al. "A model for 
information assurance: An integrated approach." Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Workshop on 




• Availability – “Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information.”13 
The combined six dimensions can be represented as such: 
 
 Storage Processing Transmission 
Confidentiality    
Integrity   
 
 
Availability    
Figure 1: Simplified Model of Information Security Management 
Within this conception, security is envisioned as being managed in a holistic way that pays 
attention to each intersecting state of information through each possible vector of compromise.  
The traditional McCumber Cube adds another three dimensions turning the above two-dimensional 
grid into a three-dimensional shape, however for the purposes of this discussion, the simplified 
model shown above will suffice.  Using this as a heuristic, the definitional quandary resulting from 
the ill-defined term ‘cyber-security’ can be avoided by focusing on the constituent make-up of all 
                                                          
13 NIST FIPS PUB 199 Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and 





things ‘cyber’, which is of course:  information.  Security is thereby incumbent upon maintaining 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information as it is being stored, transmitted and 
processed.  This does not change whether a computer scientist, CTO, political scientist, or 
layperson is discussing a ‘cyber’ prefixed topic.  It also does not change as discussion moves away 
from computing hardware to ever more abstract levels incorporating political, cultural, and social 
dynamics and aggregations.  In the end, ‘security’ comes down to assuring the six dimensions 
above are addressed for information at all levels of analysis, from individuals to the systemic level 
of nations-states and the various electronic networks intertwined therein.  The next section will 
introduce a layered model of cyberspace to help further refine the domain of analysis. 
1.4.1 Layered Model of Cyberspace 
Choucri and Clark build upon the traditional layered model of the Internet in order to 
establish a typology of analysis that integrates, according to them, traditional international 
relations levels of analysis with ‘cyberspace’.  Specifically, they’re concerned with identifying a 
method of analysis that can used to understand “cyber-actors” in terms of power relations across 
specific points of control that vary between conceptual layers.  Each layer relies additively on those 
appearing below to function.  At the lowest level is the physical infrastructure upon which cyber-
space functions such as optical fiber and other hardware.  Above that sits the ‘logical’ layer, itself 
made up of three sections, the Internet, Services, and Applications.  The TCP/IP packet protocol, 
for example, is part the ‘Internet’14.  The Domain Name Service (DNS) which translates numeric 
                                                          
14 The term ‘Internet’ is used throughout this chapter and dissertation to mean either a stratum of 
the logical layer within the discussed model or the larger socio-technical construct incorporating 
the world wide web and other various information technology related communication which 
characterizes modernity. The attempt has been made to be distinguish clearly between meanings 




addresses into the Uniform Resource Identifier (URL) commonly associated with specific internet 
addresses which end in ‘.com’, ‘.org’ etc. is the middle of the logical layer.  The application layer 
consists of what we commonly conceive up as the ‘web’ or the graphical and searchable portion 
of the Internet.  The model then incorporates two top layers.  The first is labeled, quite simply, 
‘information’ and represents, “encoded text, photos, videos, and other material that is stored, 
transmitted, and transformed in cyberspace,”15 At the very top, ‘people’ represent users and 
constituencies “who shape the cyber-experience and the nature of cyberspace itself.”16 Choucri 
and Clark present the following graphical representation of their model: 
Figure 2: Choucri and Clark Layered Model of Cyberspace17 
 
Traditional levels of global political analysis include the individual, state, and systemic 
(international system of states).  Choucri and Clark introduce the following dimensions: 1) Global 
which is non-state centered but global in nature (such as the issue of spam), 2) Non-profit and 3) 
Profit-seeking. The layers discussed above can be analyzed across the various levels of analysis.  
Their “Integrated Cyber-IR System” appears below, the ‘logical layer’ appears in dark grey.  
                                                          
15 Choucri, Nazli, and David D. Clark. "Integrating cyberspace and international relations: The 
co-evolution dilemma." (2012) available at: 
http://ecir.mit.edu/images/stories/Clark_WORKSHOP.pdf 
16 Ibid. 




Examples of issues and actors are slotted into the matrix for illustrative purposes some of which 
appear in Choucri and Clark’s similar graphic.  Not all spaces are filled.  The idea is to use the 
matrix to understand an issue or cyber-actor as a function of where they sit within the layers of 
cyber-space and the levels of analysis.  
Table 1:  Choucri and Clark Integrated Cyber-IR System 
 








NATO/ EU    
Information  Censorship  Spam  Information Control  
Applications     W3C  
Services     ICANN  






Satellite Orbits and 
Spectrum 
 
Infrastructure companies (L3, 
Verizon, etc.) 
The additional nuance that can now be added to their ‘integrated’ system is the earlier 
described notion of information security management.  Instead of trying to define ‘cyber-security’ 
across all the various and interactive layers and levels, ‘information security management’ can be 
thought of as having implications at each level.  At each of the intersecting (and through 
combinations of) dimensions, information’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability can be 
compromised as it is being stored, transmitted, and processed.  The two concepts together, the 
notion of information security management and a simplified heuristic representing a combined 
Cyber-IR system, defines the domain within which security provisioning activity occurs.  A 
security threat on/for the Internet can now be easily identified as:  Issues that impact the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information across the Cyber-IR system as its being 
processed, transmitted and/or stored.18  
                                                          
18 This definition may seem deceptively simplistic. However, the combination of McCumber 




1.5 Information Centered IR Security (ICIRS) Model 
Figures 3 and 4 below consist of synthesis graphics that can help one understand the various 
dimensions discussed above and how they interact.19  Figure 4 combines the layered model of the 
Internet with the dimensions of security while focusing on the information as a “first principal.”  
The logical layer is depicted as a single entity for simplification though it should be noted that the 
conceptual applications, services, and internet layers subsumed within the logical layer are all still 
analytically important as separate entities.  The “information layer” from the Choucri and Clark 
model has been placed at the center of the diagram to help indicate importance.  The states of 
storage, transmission, and processing have been augmented with a new state labeled “creation” to 
introduce a vector of consideration around information that is new enough to give rise to hitherto 
unseen security concerns.  One example would be the advent of social media, which can be argued 
as having created a myriad of security concerns as various levels of analysis are crossed.  The 
McCumber cube model has also been augmented with the dimension labeled “repudiation” to 
capture the importance of trust in information’s veracity at more abstract levels.  In adding both 
creation and repudiation to the model, emerging issues such as “fake news” spread through social 
media can be analyzed in a more nuanced fashion.  This dissertation does not explore such issues 
in depth, but the model is nonetheless meant to have larger general applicability than the present 
work.  
                                                          
first time. The idea is to define security for and on the Internet in the simplest manner possible. 
In doing so, subsequent analysis of security provisioning can be driven by tracing the issue 
across the various levels and layers of the Cyber-IR system and understanding the specific 
dimension of information security management impacted and addressed during the course of 
provisioning activities.  
19 This representation using concentric circles across physical and logical layers is influenced, in 
part, by conversation with and work by Steven Bigham, a cybersecurity industry professional.  It 






Figure 5 appearing below combines the information centered security model with the 
earlier outlined levels of analysis, which makes apparent that information centered security has 
implications at each level; analysis can be carried out with each level as a lens, much in the same 
way current IR scholarship utilizes traditional levels of analysis.  This represents the Information 
Centered International Relations Security model or ICIRS which is pronounced Icarus. 





The obvious question to ask at this juncture is why use the ICIRS model as an analytic heuristic 
helping define the domain under examination within this dissertation?  There is good reason to, 
the ICIRS model makes obvious how the idea of information security can be thought about as 
having implications within, and interacts with, a series of conceptual buckets that are well 
understood to scholars of International Relations.  The conceptual buckets include conceiving of 
international politics as an activity carried out both between and within States while also 
interacting with both State and non-state institutions and constituencies.  In shifting away from the 
ill-defined terminology of “cyberspace and cybersecurity” towards an information centered 
security model, the ICIRS model can drive exploration of foundational IR security concepts such 
Figure 4: Information Centered IR 




structure, agency, identity, and power.  The model is still useful to analyze power relations across 
various control points of control similar to the Choucri and Clark model, however its utility is 
vastly augmented by representing threat and focusing on information thus further defining the 
“cybersecurity” conceptual space.  Concerns of information security can be analyzed across 
several of levels of analysis as they interact and impact upon the various networks, institutions and 
hierarchies that exist across individual, state, international, global, profit-seeking, and non-profit 
levels of analysis.  Importantly, each of those levels can be further segmented according to the 
nuances inherent within the logical layers: application, services, and, internet as information in 
various states (creation, processing, storage, and transmission) passes over physical infrastructure 
and interacts within the world.  The next chapter will begin to assemble a larger framework around 
the ICIRS system to investigate the phenomena of collaborative security provisioning.  The chapter 
will also review previous work on collaborative security and cyber security relevant to 
international relations in order to seat the usage of social practice literature, later in this work, 




CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL PRACTICE:  AGENCY, STRUCTURE AND 
CULTURE 
2.1 International Security and ICIRS 
As alluded to above academic explanations of international affairs are often organized across 
various “levels of analysis,” popularly these consist of the individual, the nation-state, and the 
systemic (system of nation-states).  Within this system of levels, geopolitics are analyzed and 
explained, in-part, through assessments of structure, differential agency amongst actors, and 
involved cultural identities.  Structurally, pertinent analysis may involve typologies of power and 
attendant benefits for those whom wield more power (as both the result of and product of position 
within a structural hierarchy) and disadvantages for those whose power is lacking.  Power, itself, 
can be defined relative to other actors within a system or in absolute terms depending on school of 
theory being applied.  Theories falling loosely under the rubric of Realism sometimes define power 
as “anything that can instantiate and/or maintain control of man over man”.20  
Institutionally, drawing on liberal theories of international relations, agency is another 
pertinent concept that can be useful for understanding the ability (perhaps better defined as 
capacity) of one entity to exert influence over cooperative initiatives and structuring decisions; be 
such an entity an individual within a collective, an institution within a system of institutions, or a 
nation within a system of nation-states.  Lastly, generalizations about collective social proclivities 
are often manifested as typological distinctions labeled identities.  In the most basic sense, 
tendencies toward cooperation or competition (and conflict) may be, within the tradition of 
                                                          





ideational explanations, attributed to the existence of identities, which are either complementary 
or divergent respectively.  These explanations do not represent a contiguous spectrum, far from it 
in fact, the discipline of International Relations could easily be viewed as competition for 
dominance amongst them, and maddeningly they are not mutually exclusive either.  Often, they 
are invoked in combination with each other across levels of analysis to help explain international 
phenomena.  
Security is a foundational concept within international studies.  Often, security is conveyed 
as “high politics” which is to say, it occupies a central position within the spectrum of 
responsibilities expected of a State apparatus.  When defined relative to stability, threat can be 
seen as the propensity (overt or covert) of one’s opponent to seek additional power which will, by 
its very nature, diminish your own according to Realist IR theorists and derivative schools of 
thought.  Thereby the term security derives from this idea of threat.  A secure environment is one 
that is stable and is characterized by the absence of threat.  As discussed previously, States are 
presented with a paradox by placing “cyberspace” next to other strategic domains due the inherent 
differences between the non-constituent nature of the information space versus the well understood 
physical spaces that make up the four other domains.  Security within and for the other domains is 
ensured, at the most basic level, by states maintaining an ability to move with impunity and 
maintain a position of force dominance within those physical spaces.  The obvious question is then 
raised, how are the concepts of power and agency followed subsequently by security, defined 
within the strategic domain of cyberspace with regard to international relations?  
The notion of power being rooted in structure and/or agency is inherent within the ICIRS 
model defined above.  Joseph Nye’s neoliberal conception of power can be easily ported to the 




of resources that relate to the creation, control and communication of electronic and computer 
based information”21 going further to state “defined behaviorally, cyber power is the ability to 
obtain preferred outcomes through use of electronically interconnected information resources in 
the cyber domain.”22  Nye identifies that cyberspace exists as a set of layered physical and virtual 
domains, though his writings on the subject don’t explicitly conceptualize the system as it is 
defined within this dissertation.  The idea of power must be thought of as having various 
implications at the different layers and levels of analysis within the ICIRS model.  One large facet 
of power within that system can be easily identified from the earlier conversation of threat.  Entities 
that can 1) recognize threats and 2) act to effectively remediate those threats are then powerful 
within the context of that system, and by extension the real world.  Certainly, the opposite is true 
as well, entities that can successfully project threat and harm also possess a dimension of power.  
It will be shown later in this work that a community of practice has arisen around the need to 
provide for recognition and remediation of large-scale threats to the Internet.  Parts of that 
community may overlap with State resources, but large portions also exist independent of 
exclusive control of any single State. The usage of communities of practice will allow for 
conceptual bridges between traditional international relations theory and cyber-security.  Using 
the ICIRS model defined above, structure, agency, identity and power can all be systematically 
explored within the context of security provisioning on/for the Internet. 
 The management of information security has implications across the levels of analysis and 
constituent layers of the combined international relations and information security model that has 
been presented. Clearly, the act of provisioning security across the entirety of that system cannot 
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be explained fully within the present work alone.  This dissertation is only concerned with 
exploring security provisioning activities that occur to address large-scale problems arising on the 
Internet.  The precise measure of what can be considered large-scale is purposefully not defined.  
Instead, an imprecise measure is used which is:  problems that impact a significant portion of 
Internet users and impede the function of the Internet in a non-trivial manner.  
These problems are numerous and occur with relative frequency.23  Malicious software that 
either steals information or harnesses a computer’s resources to perpetuate further criminal activity 
are common examples.  As are problems that arise due to fragilities inherent in how the Internet is 
engineered.  For example, the issue of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing errors that will be 
discussed at length later in this work.  Rather than define this class of problems here, specific case 
references appearing later in this dissertation will help further explicate this class of security threat.  
In addition to the scale of damage/impediment, this dissertation is chiefly concerned with security 
provisioning activity that is international in nature.  This means, in the course of addressing these 
large-scale problems, individuals and entities involved engage in a measure of international 
collaboration at some point during the incident/case being studied.  That in and of itself isn’t an 
arbitrary requirement, but one that is inherent due to the nature of the Internet.  Threats are often 
not confined to one geographic location but are, in fact, distributed internationally.  Understanding 
the community of practice involved in the collaborative provisioning of security on/for the Internet 
helps further define and operationalize a facet of power regading “cyberspace” as conceived of by 
Nye and other theorists and practitioners.  Having established the domain and activity under 
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examination, the next section will place security communities of practice within a larger body of 
international relations and social theory. 
2.2 Security Provisioning Networks  
Consider the Network.  As a concept, abstraction, and metaphor, the network is having its 
moment in the sun, though according to some, that moment may even already have passed in a 
blur.  Given the centrality of digital networks to everyday existence, the pervasive application of 
the network moniker to other domains isn’t particularly surprising.  Conceptually, networks, have 
reached buzzword status within the popular, let alone academic, zeitgeist.  They’re conceptually 
easy to understand, and highlight the operationalized mechanism du jour, the relationship.  This is 
to say, nodes connected in a relational graph, either explicitly conceived or abstractly referenced 
are thought to highlight import facets of modern social and socio-technical structure.  Network 
metaphors aside, collaborative forms of security have long been a feature of the international 
system and the study of how such mechanisms emerge, evolve, dissolve and sustain themselves is 
a topic of scholarly political and social science research.  Historically, this research centers on 
bilateral and multilateral alliances and/or the balancing against or around such arrangements, 
focusing on the state as the central unit of analysis.  More recently, scholars have tried to 
incorporate sub-state interaction into analysis of not just security collaboration but of international 
behavior in general.  In the largest sense, schools of theory such as Constructivism have tried to 
incorporate intersubjective meaning across the levels of analysis allowing for sub-state actors to 
play central roles in shaping behavior and thus inter-state interaction.  
At the mid-level of theory building, the idea of informal networks that exist across political 




that exist between states comprised of low and mid-level bureaucratic elements within their 
respective governments.24 Gerspacher and Dupont detail “the nodal structure” of international 
police cooperation, characterizing informal initiatives pursued by law enforcement agencies 
outside of formal state to state mechanisms.25  Analysis within the present work conceives of the 
various constituencies involved with the provisioning of security on/for the Internet as a form of 
social practice within communities of practice that interact across “seams” aggregated as a 
“security provisioning network.  Literature emanating from social science and international studies 
seeking to explicate network collaboration must be explored to establish a detailed basis for the 
conception of such a network 
2.3 Social Practice 
Information security provisioning is referenced within this dissertation as an “embedded 
social practice.”  That formulization derives from a tradition within sociology and political theory 
that relates group behavior, intersubjective meaning, preferences, incentives, and outcomes to 
individual agency.  In short, an embedded practice is established within a cultural context.  Victoria 
Hand writes, “Sociocultural or situative perspectives conceptualize culture as being located in the 
joint social activity of individuals as they do work together, use tools, solve problems, and reify 
the meanings of their activities.”26  Social practice then is an operationalized expression of that 
cultural context.  Specifically, social practice comprises of language, tools, procedures, norms, 
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26 Hand, V. (2006). Operationalizing Culture and Identity in Ways to Capture the Negotiation of 




subtle gestures, word-views, and other explicit and implicit signs of community membership.”27  
Understanding security provisioning on or for the Internet requires an analytic framework that 
describes how the activity is shaped, influenced and co-constituted within a community of practice. 
This community of practice centers on security and an evolving response to perceived threats based 
on interactions across boundaries with other constituencies and communities of practice from other 
domains. 
 Above, it was noted that this dissertation takes a pragmatic approach to analysis.  The 
approach is pragmatic because it does not try to project or presuppose intentions upon the 
individuals and entities under study.  Instead, it is first concerned with what those entities do. 
Meaning, the analysis is rooted in understanding the social practice of provisioning security and 
how that practice represents and generates a specific and discernable culture.  Analyzing that 
culture means explicating the working practices, problem solving indications, language, tools, 
explicit and implicit meanings generated by a specific constituency of individuals.  Social practice 
literature represents a response to a supposed rationality bias which has dominated social theory 
over the past several decades.  Vincent Populiot writes:   
“…most of what people do, in world politics as in any other social field, does not 
derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection – instrumental, rule-
based, communicative, or otherwise. Instead, practices are the result of inarticulate, 
practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear “self-evident” or 
commonsensical. This is the logic of practicality, a fundamental feature of social 
life that is often overlooked by social scientists.”28 
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Populiot proposes that “the logic of practice” helps fill a gap in the explanatory toolkit of social 
science which normally explains social action as deriving from, 1) instrumental rationality (logic 
of consequences), 2) norm-following (logic of appropriateness), or 3) communicative action.  
(logic of arguing).  Importantly, according to Populiot, the logic of practice is ontologically prior 
to the other three due to its location at the intersection of agency and structure.  Whereas both 
instrumental rationality and communicative action derive from individual agency, and norm-
following is overly determined by an ideological super-structure, the logic of practice allows for 
an eclectic blending along the agent-structure spectrum.29  That being said, the logic of practice is 
complementary to the others and Populiot is advocating using it as such.  Practice, in many ways, 
can be easily understood as “tacit knowing” which allows reflexive actions.  This is useful because 
it allows analysis to follow naturally from observing regularities or differences in the way action 
is carried out instead of trying to discern indications of an ideological frame.  This isn’t to say that 
intersubjective meaning isn’t important or doesn’t exist, but is to say that focusing on practice 
doesn’t rely on extrapolating representational knowledge from indirect indications.  It instead 
allows behavior that aligns across a constituency to serve as an indication of a culture comprised 
of social practice.  Quoting Zerubavel, Populiot discusses representational bias:  “…social 
scientists sometimes ascribe rules to the actor when it is only the actor’s behavior that is being 
described.  In many cases in which behavior is described as following rules, there may be in fact 
no rules inside the actor.”30  The types of behaviors referenced here are diverse.  These can include 
a choice regarding the type of community or collaboration chosen to address certain problems.  
For example, the designation of a ‘working-group’ or the choice of one amongst a number of 
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possible partners.  These types of choices are examples of abstract goals reified into practical 
solutions. This shift from representational and ideational knowledge to behavior as an indication 
of practice is necessary when analyzing information security provisioning activities due to the 
complex, diffuse, and largely unmapped structure.  These provisioning networks are surrounded 
by the ideological flux the ‘cyber’ domain engenders.  That complexity precludes analysis that 
starts by trying to understand structure first and agency second.  By defining Internet security 
provisioning as an embedded social practice, one is able to define a collection of people who 
engage on an ongoing basis in some common endeavor that are bound not by virtue of a shared 
abstract characteristics or through simple co-presence, but by shared practice.31  This collection 
can be termed a “community of practice” and is discussed below.  
2.3.1 Security as Practice 
Using the ICIRS model and social practice as a starting point, the thrust of this dissertation 
defines the Internet security provisioning community as a constituency whose actions constitute 
“practice” and follow from a distinct culture.  Later in this dissertation that culture is separated 
into two levels, one which operates at a systemic level (with regards to the Internet) and one that 
emerges to address specific problems.  This leads to a security provisioning network fashioned 
across multiple separate constituencies and conditioned by the specific context within which each 
node is embedded.  Conceptually, communities of practice help define the boundaries of each 
distinct constituency being examined.  Members of a community of practice are not simply 
individuals that share an interest instead, “…members of a community of practice are practitioners.  
They develop a shared repertoire of resources: Experiences, stories, tools, ways of addressing 
                                                          





recurring problems – in short a shared practice.  This takes time and sustained interaction.”32  
Etienne Wenger and Jean Lave developed the concept as way to understand learning in social 
settings.  The concept is widely leveraged in organizational and sociological literature and was 
developed from the perspective of cultural anthropology.  Originally it was leveraged to explain 
the type of learning occurring during apprenticeship, and the term community of practice referred 
to the “community that acts as a living curriculum for the apprentice.”33  The concept has been 
further subsumed and incorporated into (relatively) recent international organization literature 
emanating from political science disciplines and generally referred to the as “practical turn.”34  
Within the present work, communities of practice provide a way to operationalize social practice 
within the analyzed sets of social actors.  The following characteristics of communities of practice 
are identified by Wegner: 
• “Communities of practice enable practitioners to take collective 
responsibility for managing the knowledge they need recognizing that, given 
the proper structure, they are in the best position to do this. 
• “Communities among practitioners create a direct link between learning and 
performance, because the same people participate in communities of practice 
and in teams and business units 
• “Practitioners can address the tacit and dynamic aspects of knowledge 
creation and sharing, as well as the more explicit aspects 
• “Communities are not limited by formal structures:  they create connections 
among people across organizational and geographic boundaries.”35 
 
While those characteristics are specifically formulated about business communities, the 
characteristics are easily ported to alternative contexts.  Operationalizing such characteristics can 
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be done by looking for specific instances of:  1) problem solving, 2) explicit acts of seeking out 
experience through social networks, 3) reusing assets across problem-sets, 4) coordination and 
synergy through combining efforts amongst actors, 5) active discussions amongst a set of linked 
practitioners, 6) documentation of processes to codify skills and document resources, and 7) 
mapping knowledge to identify gaps through intentional interrogation of knowledge networks to 
establish baseline understanding amongst practitioners.36  This non-exhaustive list describes 
indications of shared practice amongst a discrete group of actors/entities.   
 The lens of practice is only just now being applied to the study and continued operation 
and security of the Internet.  Ashwin Matthew’s 2014 dissertation in the field of information and 
human geography argues that stability of Internet infrastructure relies on “distributed governance” 
of technical communities connected both within themselves and amongst communities by 
reciprocal trust relationships.  He extends this argument to discuss trust in technology, trust in 
institutions, and trust in processes that have evolved across the communities, technologies and 
institutions.37  More recently Matthew revisits the ideas of trust and practice to describe the 
cybersecurity space as a “fragmented whole” that relies on a community of practice characterized 
by trust to execute cybersecurity.  In doing so he is further extending his dissertation research from 
the network operations space to the cybersecurity space.38  Matthew also draws on the communities 
of practice literature of Wegner and Lave to operationalize security execution referencing the idea 
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of problem solving.  The recent work does not robustly establish the communities of practice 
elements it claims to draw from, instead the claim is established in a few short paragraphs 
contained in the appendix to the paper.  The paper’s main accomplishment is presenting data 
gathered through surveys and interviews, which establish the characteristic of trust as a central 
element of a community of practice centered on information security.  Matthew’s work reinforces 
the claim argued in this dissertation that conceives of communities of practice as the way in which 
large scale security is addressed on/for the Internet, instantiating a constituency to problem solve 
and reify shared goals into action.  However, while Matthew makes ontologically similar social 
science-based arguments to the present work, Matthew’s work leaves several gaps, 1) Trust, while 
a central characteristic of the communities of practice under examination, is but one dimension 
amongst many that define the space. Others can be derived from the larger body of social practice 
literature and include language, world views, normative behaviors, and others. 2) What Matthew 
terms distributed governance, and herein is termed `distributed agency’, intersects and interreacts 
with multiple dimensions across the levels of analysis defined within the ICIRS model, and should 
be analyzed as such.  3) Communities of practice within the information security space necessarily 
interact in due course of problem solving with a plethora of communities, individuals, entities and 
institutions that are outside of the trust relationships Matthew identifies.  This fact is also inherently 
obvious when using the ICIRS model to analyze the case studies that appear later in this work.  
How then, can these necessary and important interactions be operationalized for the purposes of 
understanding?   
Explaining how that process is structured rests heavily on the idea of “seams”.  Seams are 
simply boundaries that exist between culturally distinct sub-sets.  As social networks (addressing 




important nexus forcing decisions related to the structure, direction, tenor, and design of 
burgeoning collaborative environments/communities.  Additionally, the concept of seams serves 
as a useful abstraction connecting the socio-theoretical underpinnings of this analysis to the above 
elucidated ICIRS modes.  Levels of analysis and above discussed ‘layers’ of the Internet can be 
considered helpful signposts at which to look for important seams.  The intersection of the 
dimensions of information security management, similarly, help identify other important seams.  
The next section will introduce and operationalize the idea of seams.  
2.4 Organizational Seams 
The term “organizational seams” refers to boundaries between separate organizations or 
their component sub-organizations, the boundaries arise due to anything that can inhibit free and 
easy communication/coordination.  Seams are a natural by-product of the need to specialize, to 
provide for division of labor, or to divide gross organizational size into more manageable parts.  
The concept was developed by Salomone and Crecine to analyze NATO forces drawn from various 
national militaries that were pursuing coordination and interoperability in the central region of 
Europe during the Cold War, and extends the work of Simon, Cyert, and March in the 1950s and 
1960s that looks at organizational behavior.39  Seams, conceptually, make intuitive sense, in that-
whenever two or more distinct organizations or sub-components of an organization(s) interact, 
information must pass between the sets.  That “chasm” across which communication and resources 
must flow is a “seam”.  The sources of seams abound and as similarities give way to differences, 
seams will multiply.  This framework extends the idea of specialized division of labor necessitated 
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due to limits in a rational actor’s cognitive capacity, a hallmark of the Carnegie School of 
management literature.  When applied to the realm of cyber security provisioning, the seams 
framework helps discern a central structuring mechanism of the “patchwork” response system 
which has grown organically over the course of the Internet’s evolution.  That mechanism consists 
of two parts, one is the need to pass information and resources amongst partners involved in the 
threat recognition and remediation of large-scale problems (i.e. in order to accomplish task x, with 
whom do I need to collaborate?).  The second part is the distinct context within which a single 
‘node’ (individual, institution, and/or entity) is already embedded.  Those two considerations then 
help drive structuring decisions defining the nature and specific instantiation of a security 
provisioning community of practice relevant to the problem/threat at hand.  
These “seams” within and amongst organizations and their subunits can be either minor or 
major, depending on the dissimilarities of the organizations and subunits involved.  The nature of 
the seams can either enable or constrain attempts at coordination.  Entities involved in provisioning 
security across cyberspace are not homogenous in terms of their goals, incentives, and 
disincentives.  In fact, their own unique organizational culture, their standard operation procedures, 
and their internal supervisory controls all condition the way in which they coordinate with other 
entities.  This helps explain the range of outcomes and pathways possible during instances of 
security provisioning.  The seams within the patchwork response mechanism and involved 
constituencies can result in the cyber response coordination problem, named to highlight the 
inherent difficulty of managing security response across the patchwork system. 
Coordination can be defined rather simply as the management of interdependent 
relationships that necessitates the exchange of information in order to align actors’ intentions, 




to the overlapping institutional and inter-institutional make-up of necessary resources brought to 
bear on both the threat recognition and remediation phases of any particular cyber security 
problem/event.  Writing with regard to Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) which 
will be discussed further later in this work, Choucri et al. argue the primary inhibitor to using 
CERTs as a vector for cyber security coordination regards hesitation among members making data 
available across their cohort of partners.40  Many private companies that participate in such 
collectives are hesitant to share cyber vulnerability intelligence due to fear or reputational harm.  
This is but one example of the coordinative inhibitions that plague the cyber response patchwork 
leading to characterization of the space as “ad-hoc” shifting and/or abstract.  The patchwork 
remains hard to categorize in unitary fashion.  Empirically, too many involved entities and 
stakeholders exist to directly map, but that doesn’t mean structure is not present.  The ICIRS 
system, along with the concept of seams, is aimed at helping discern, and give shape to that 
structure.   
The application of seams within the cyber context is motivated by two observations. First, 
the cyber response patchwork consists of capabilities distributed horizontally across various 
technical, non-technical, private, public, domestic and international constituencies. Second, within 
the US context, cybersecurity has evolved in an ever more specializing manner that is continually 
creating additional seams while sometimes forcing change across others. This is obvious by 
observing the evolution of offensive and defensive cyber missions within the US military.41  
Currently, for example, the recent elevation of a US Cyber Command to a full combatant command 
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status may create new seams between Cyber Command and the subunits it will now direct while 
also widening existing seams between US Cyber Command and its antecedent organizations as 
relationships that have historically developed change, and as new seams are created by the new 
structure.  
Solving the coordination problem becomes even more difficult if there are both inter- and 
intra-organizational coordinative necessities, as with the cyber domain in which seams exist within 
organizations and between several disparate organizations.  The cyber response infrastructure has 
intragovernmental seams, interagency seams, international seams, and seams between the private 
and government sector, among others.  Currently the cybersecurity response infrastructure has not 
institutionalized a structure that can fully solve or ameliorate the coordination problem within its 
domain.  These seams and the multitude of stakeholders with different interests and capabilities 
can create coordination problems complicating effective responses across the myriad of issues 
definable across the ICIRS conceptual space. 
 Even further, technology can exacerbate organizational seams and heightens the 
boundaries between individual organizational agents. Simply as a straightforward organizational 
issue, any new technology brings new standards, new information, and new capabilities, all of 
which must be integrated into existing technologies and practices.  As an emerging technology, 
the cybersecurity space is further characterized by intense volatility and rapid technological 
evolution. When thought of in this manner, the current flux and continued evolution of the 
cybersecurity response infrastructure should lead to confusion. 
Recognizing and responding effectively and efficiently to large-scale cyber mediated 




the Internet and information exchange networks.  Within the public sector, each entity maintains 
its own information systems (i.e. computer systems, servers, and so forth), at multiple levels of 
classification, with ranging security protocols and policies.  Consequently, there exist inherent 
challenges marshaling those resources that may not be directed by a centralized command scheme 
and instead be located within and across organizations not adept at coordinating with each other.   
This obviously begs the question, how can one identify the important seams present with 
any set of issues or inherent to a particular situation or problem?  This is where the ICIRS 
framework is useful to keep in mind.  When parsing an issue or security threat and/or looking at a 
historical example of a remediation effort, it helps to focus on the exchange of information and 
resources across levels of analysis, and/or through various layers of the information centered 
security model (logical, people, etc.) to help drive seam identification.  This can help illuminate 
places where an information gulf exists and some sort of coordinative reconciliation needs to 
happen.  The case studies in subsequent chapters of this dissertation will further operationalize 
this. 
It is important to note that there are other theoretical frameworks for understanding 
coordination in cyberspace.  For example, Raymond argues that mitigation and management 
processes are essential in order to maintain internet stability and prevent disruptions.  Consistent 
with the seams framework presented in this dissertation, Raymond finds that these challenges are 
due, in part, to the large number of rules and the involvement of a wide array of actors.42  He argues 
that decisions made by one actor could have “intended or unintended effects” on other actors. The 
combination of these effects with the decentralized nature of the regime complex can create 
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coordination and conflict resolution problem.43  However, Raymond suggests that coordination 
can occur and offers a solution to these problems, through the creation of a prohibition regime able 
to address threats in the international security realm.  As noted above, coordination within this 
dissertation is defined as the act of exchanging information to align goals and intentions, and 
furthermore its definition here is in support of establishing the idea of practice within a community 
of practice.  Admittedly, the concept isn’t further defined in relation to related terminology such 
as “cooperation” and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably.  However, the key idea is that 
information must flow across seams in order for problems to be recognized and remediated, those 
seams can be small or minor and help enable a solution or they can be large and major which will 
impede progress toward a solution.  Chapter three and four will provide evidence of these 
coordination challenges and evidence of the emergence of a community of practice within the 
cyber security response system through an examination of the Internet’s evolution and specific 
cases of security response.  Before doing so, related work collaborative security on and for the 
Internet will be reviewed.  
2.5 Related Literatures 
The issue of cybersecurity and information security within the transnational security space 
is studied from a several of theoretical and academic perspectives.  Some of those literatures related 
to this area are relevant here, both ontologically in terms of theoretical derivation and via examined 
content (security provisioning on/for the Internet) and are briefly reviewed and summarized below.  
Without a doubt, the theoretical lens of practice should be complementary to many of the efforts 
                                                          




detailed below.  The ICIRS model is also useful as a tool to help sort and make sense of the level 
analysis and unit of analysis each of these literatures focus on.   
One area of widespread agreement within the ambit of analyzing the modern socio-political 
security implications of the Internet is that the literature has yet to mature and is in its “infancy”. 
Often this means the existing literature suffers from any number of limitations despite making 
useful contributions to understanding the various facets of security on/for the Internet.  Just as the 
idea that cyber-security is a contested term that makes it hard define analytically - taken as a whole-
social science literature regarding cyber-security can be difficult to categorize systematically.  
Still, authors have looked at the Internet security provisioning space narrowly producing 
descriptive and nascent theoretical literature.  Judged independently of the academic literature, 
information security infrastructure springing up around the Internet clearly indicates a rapid 
growth and an ever-enlarging scale.  Early social science academic works were descriptive in 
nature and sought to describe the number of organizations and their role with respect to the 
Internet’s security mechanism.  Those descriptive works didn’t extend to operationalizing that 
mechanism analytically for the production of deeper insights.  More recent work does use 
theoretical frameworks to generate insight, the following sections will review a few bodies of 
literature that sit adjacent to or are complementary to the current effort.  The purpose of discussing 
these works is to place this dissertation within the larger theoretical body of work looking at 
cybersecurity emanating from international relations social science. 
2.5.1 Networked Governance 
Mueller et.al. suggest that Internet security provisioned by non-hierarchical collectives 




activities to the Conficker botnet and security surrounding internet routing as examples.44  
Networked governance is defined in their work through a discussion how the idea of ‘networks’ 
emerged as a separate organizational type distinct from markets and hierarchies before being 
applied to social relations and international affairs.  The key distinction of networked forms of 
governance, according to Mueller et.al. is that actors are relationally linked and choose to 
collaborate in a manner that is not imposed from the top (hierarchy) nor based on transactional 
interaction in a market defined manner.  The idea that network analogies are being utilized by 
social science in two separate ways is echoed by Kahler who separates two approaches termed 
networks as “structures” and networks as “actors”.  When used to convey structural facets of 
importance, network theory uses formalized quantitative measures such as “embeddedness” and 
“centrality” to precisely describe a node’s structural relationship with regards to other nodes in 
formally defined network.  However, when used in conjunction with the idea of networks as actors, 
Kahler defines networks in much the same way as Mueller et. al.  According to this tact, “Networks 
are not treated as omnipresent features of social life,” but are a specific form of organization that 
is separate from the hierarchical organization of states.45    
This idea of entwining cyber-security and networked governance has a developed history.  
Prior to the above discussed works, networked governance is defined by Muller in his 2010 work 
Networks and States in which he draws connections between the organizational metaphor of 
networks and the regulatory features that allow the Internet to function within the modern system 
of States.  Security is an area Mueller does spend time to develop, both through case study 
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exploration and theoretical discussion.  Most relevant to this dissertation, he makes the following 
observations: 
“(1) responding to cybersecurity problems involves highly scalable, difficult to-
trace actions and distributed actors and attacks that easily cross national borders, 
which often exceeds the capabilities of national approaches to Internet governance; 
(2) the inadequacy prompts the development of new organizational arrangements 
that reconstitute relationships among business, government, and civil society in this 
sphere; (3) the successes and failures of these new arrangements pose novel 
political issues and governance problems that generate institutional change at the 
transnational level.”46  
This dissertation uses Mueller’s observations detailed above as a jumping off point to understand 
in a less abstract matter what sorts of organizational arrangements across government, business, 
and civil society provision security in the face of large-scale threats to the Internet’s function.  
Most recently, Kuerbis and Badiei attempt to “map the cybersecurity institutional 
landscape” using a theoretical framework based on new institutional economics (NIE) onto which 
they graft the concept of governance structures.  Their analysis connects the various activities 
performed under the rubric of cybersecurity as being part of an institutional landscape organized 
into three buckets: markets, networks, and hierarchies.  This represents an extension of themes 
visited in the earlier work co-authored by Kuberis and touched on above.47  Botnet mitigation (also 
utilized as a case study in this dissertation) is discussed briefly as an example in which all three 
structures are readily apparent as a form of successful cybersecurity provisioning.  The paper is a 
useful abstraction of the provisioning space, especially as it helps define the diverse number of 
incentives emanating from various actors/entities involved within the space.  Those incentives may 
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lead to establishment of market, hierarchical, and networked organizational collectives that then 
address cybersecurity related issues.48  
Writing in the same journal volume in which Kuerbis and Badiei’s work appears, van Eeten 
deftly points out the disconnect between the discourse of governance and the application of control 
as a direct outcome of governance.  He shows that much of the debate surrounding cybersecurity 
governance seems to be divorced from the “actual provisioning of cybersecurity on the ground.” 
49  This begs the question, what connects the idea of “networked governance” to the actual 
provisioning activities which that place in the real world?  To be sure, the case studies explored 
together and independently by Mueller, Mueller et.al., Schmidt and by many other authors help 
operationalize that connection.  However, much of the emerging literature places Internet security 
response activities coordinated among transnational coalitions of public/private entities within a 
networked structure, while failing to discretely define nodes and edges due the explicit separation 
of “networks as structures” vs “networks as actors” and/or a distinct organizational type.  Instead, 
such work theorizes about networks and hierarchies in the abstract, qualitatively describing what 
amounts to case studies or sketches lacking formal conceptualization as a network nor a robust 
understanding of how that network’s ability to turn goals and intentions into “action on the ground” 
as pointed out by van Eeten.  This abstract discussion of the Internet security provisioning space 
points to a conspicuous gap within the emerging literature, one that can be filled, with regards to 
security, with the concept of a “security community of practice” operating in a networked fashion 
as discussed below.  To be sure, Mueller’s body of work develops the network metaphor in relation 
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to the governance of the Internet robustly and usefully.  This dissertation seeks to add another level 
of nuance to better specify and understand the ‘network’ under examination.  In order to do so, 
there must be a recognition that nodes within the provisioning network do not exist in a vacuum, 
this is to say each node is embedded in a specific social context that conditions and shapes 
interactions that they have with other nodes.  This, in turn, gives rise to a unique problem 
solving/provisioning culture that influences subsequent interactions.  The lens of practice can be 
seen as helping fill in the gaps around and complementing the network governance literature, thus 
addressing the space identified by van Eeten.  
2.5.2 Peer Production 
Andreas Schmidt speaks more directly to the specific issue of this dissertation by 
submitting that the production of internet security (by which he means the addressing of threats 
and problems) is currently going through a change in which collaborative networks are evolving 
hierarchies due to increased government intervention.  Schmidt terms these networks “hybrids” 
referencing both the hierarchical and non-hierarchical elements of security production systems.50  
Schmidt is worth discussing further, as his work has followed from his own dissertation that looked 
at “social production” of internet security.  He asserts that the type of security collaboration 
present, historically, on the Internet represents a unique form of distributed production indigenous 
to the information age, although his dissertation then moves on to focus on speculation about the 
concept’s future.51  Peer production, central to Schmidt’s argument partially follows Benkler’s 
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formulation of social production, which is aimed at explaining how new collaborative technologies 
(such as peer produced open sourced software) have given rise to a “networked information 
economy.”  Benkler did not develop any examples specific to information security within his book 
on the subject.52  Using two case studies, the response to the attack on Estonian networks in 2007 
and the Conficker botnet response in 2008-2009, Schmidt concludes that the production of security 
on the Internet represents a unique form characterized by a tension between openness (which 
typically characterizes peer production) and necessitated secrecy.  He labels this a “variant” of 
peer production and sketches a topology of such networks using the Conficker botnet remediation 
effort to operationalize various facets.  Openness is discussed as having limits when applied within 
the operational security segment of Internet security production and Schmidt points to various 
models of trust which that community has tried to evolve.53  
Schmidt’s later paper on emerging hierarchies within Internet security networks begins 
discussion by briefly outlining three “prominent ideal-type systems for international security.”  He 
lists balance-of-power relations, collective security, hegemonic peace, and international regimes 
all as a way in which war is prevented within an anarchic international system.  He then goes on 
to make the assertion that ‘networked security’ represents a fifth ideal type.54  In doing so he is 
borrowing Gruszcak’s conceptualization of networked security, which was developed as an 
explanation of the types of loosely coupled information exchanges and governance structures used 
to address security in failed states such as Afghanistan.55  Instead of applying the concept within 
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the milieu of counter-insurgency doctrine, Schmidt claims networked security, conceptually, 
describes the manner in which internet security is provided relying on the same examples he and 
Mueller cited in the work discussed above along with brief sketches of several more recent 
examples.  Schmidt does not robustly develop the claim that networked security can stand beside 
the other four systemic ideal-types he cited.  Instead he simply states ‘security scholars’ have begun 
to explore diffuse networked structures as a way in which security is provided.  The argument he 
develops shifts from discussing international security between states, to how collaborative security 
is provisioned on the Internet.  According to him, states are currently asserting and defining what 
constitutes ‘legitimacy’ when it comes to Internet security and governance.  As such he concludes 
hierarchies are being established over the previously diffuse networked nature of Internet security 
and by extension governance.  Peer production is a useful analytic lens with which to describe the 
types of activities under consideration within this dissertation. However, peer production is 
difficult to seat and operationalize within the larger theoretical literature of International Relations 
and Security, which is another thrust of this dissertation.  That difficulty stems, in part, from the 
fact the remediation activities under examination involve constituencies which extend beyond and 
outside the information technology means on which peer production relies on, and the activities 
exist in within a much larger socio-political context and culture.  The idea that “security scholars” 
are now grappling with the issue of networked security archetypes is correct, and as such the 
practice lens is complementary to Schmidt’s work  
2.5.3  Regime Complexes 
Regimes are a formalized set of norms and regime complexes are the loose affiliation 
amongst regimes that lay between formal legal instruments and disparate patchworks of applicable 




overlap between institutions.  Cyber-space has been described as representing a space governed 
through a myriad overlapping institutions, regimes, and norms.  Joseph Nye has described the 
“Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities” within which there exists a subset, 
across a large swath of the totality, which impact upon security.  Nye positions his work as a 
mapping exercise meant to describe the system as a whole, but readily admits a comprehensive 
direct mapping is not possible given the breadth of total involved entities, formal and informal, is 
vast.56  Regime Complexes have a larger history within IR and security literature, Hofmann, for 
example, describes the manner in which NATO and EU security institutions have evolved in 
relation to each other as a regime complex in which developments within one can lead to a 
reordering within the other.57 She describes this sort of interaction as “chessboard politics” and 
typologizes among a set of behaviors within such a system.  Hofmann states such “chessboard 
politics” manifest themselves in member state strategies that she calls “‘hostage taking,’ ‘turf 
battles,’ and ‘muddling through.’”58 Using the example of Cyprus and Turkey, Hofmann shows 
how each country was able to take advantage of their position to shape the relationship between 
their two respective organizations (the EU and NATO) despite neither being reciprocal members 
of both organizations, this ‘hostage’ taking relies on overlapping regime connectivity and not on 
direct control of consequences.  The ‘turf-battle’ strategy is used to differentiate, shape and 
influence mandates of involved organizations to include or exclude various interests.  Hofmann 
cites the view taken by Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain during the Berlin Plus negotiations that 
favored calls for an independent and autonomous alternative to NATO instead of a closer 
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arrangement.59  When the two strategies are implemented, it can lead to the situation where a clear 
division of labor between institutions does not develop and the resulting dynamic is one in which 
ambiguity reigns and informal alternatives are sought –the act of muddling through as it were.  
Hofmann’s assessment is useful as it lends several ‘sign posts’ to look for when analyzing systems 
displaying regime complexity. 
Similarly Raymond argues that mitigation and management processes are essential in order 
to maintain Internet stability and prevent disruptions, finding that these challenges are due, in part, 
to the large number of rules and the involvement of a wide array of actors.60  He argues that 
decisions made by one actor could have “intended or unintended effects” on other actors.  The 
combination of these effects with the decentralized nature of the regime complex can create 
coordination and conflict resolution problems.61  However, Raymond suggests that coordination 
can occur and offers a solution to these problems through the creation of a prohibition regime able 
to address threats in the international security realm. 
The regime complex literature is typical of IR/security literature in that it has a bias towards 
state centric conceptions of relationships, despite its discussion of norms and institutions (which 
while a main focus are always placed relative to the state centric model).  Hofmann’s work is of 
interest as it provides a way to operationalize regime connectivity that can lead to various effects 
despite a lack of formal direct connection between two entities, but instead possessing a shared 
third-party vector.  Similarly, the seams framework should be seen as a step towards understanding 
and operationalizing and eventually allowing for typologies of certain types of behaviors across 
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various contexts, beyond the major/minor divide identified earlier in this dissertation.  Admittedly, 
the lens of practice is suited to a less abstract and more individual level of analysis than regime 
complexes.  
2.5.4  Science and Technology Studies 
Another emerging area of literature involves using the lens of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) to describe cybersecurity.  STS views technology as part of a social, political, and 
cultural fabric that cannot be separated.  The STS lens has been used extensively to understand the 
connection between technology and politics, this includes security.  Most recently, Cavelty uses 
the STS to focus on cybersecurity as social practice “enacted and stabilized through the circulation 
of knowledge about vulnerabilities.”62  STS  includes approaches such as Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) that treats technological artifacts as objects possessing “general ontological symmetry 
between human and non-human entities”.  In doing so, the entities are analyzed as having relational 
implications that explain socio-cultural and political emergence and sustainment.  Scholars within 
this school of thought are often interested in how social practices emerge, spread, and become 
normalized and when such practices break down.  That process (of breaking down) is called 
“depunctualization” and characterized by the interruption of a stable network which reveals how 
those networks function.63  Cavelty approaches the topic first by discussing the various meanings 
cybersecurity has with respect to technology and social science.  She does this by usage of 
bibliometric data which quantified cybersecurity publications filtered through the subject heading 
of “international relations” within several citation databases.  Afterward, Stuxnet is discussed as a 
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depunctualization event to show how a technological object (a vulnerability in this case) depicts 
the network representing cybersecurity practices have political implications.  Cavelty concludes 
that the intersection of technical understandings of cybersecurity and vulnerabilities need to be 
bridged with the social perspective to understand how “knowledge about vulnerabilities is created, 
disseminated and transformed into political (and other) effects.”64  This dissertation is a step in 
that direction, the lens of practice helps show how knowledge is created, codified, shared, and 
leveraged to produce security and create a community of practice.  This has implications at various 
levels of social order, the ICIRS model helps define discreet levels of analysis at which those 
implications play out.  While sharing a focus on practice, this dissertation does not adopt the full 
ANT worldview linking technology and human actors as social objects with similar features.  
Instead the lens of practice used here is developed through a separate theoretical tradition and 
substantiates its descriptive usage by exploring provisioning activities at a less abstract level of 
analysis than Cavelty 
2.6 Agency, Structure, and Power during Security Provisioning 
The ICIRS model defined in chapter one introduced the reader to a series of intersecting 
and interacting dimensions to help define a conceptual space within which security provisioning 
on/for the Internet can be holistically explored in conjunction with and in regard to the socio-
political space.  Thus far chapter two has drawn together a subset of IR and social science literature 
to help understand the provisioning of security within specific subsets of people and institutions 
as a social practice that can be further defined as a security community of practice operating across 
seams.  This framework will be leveraged in the next chapter to show how a unique problem-
                                                          




solving culture evolved amongst internet security professionals as consequence of early structure, 
decision making, and evolution of the Internet through important security events.  The framework 
that has been described thus far is uniquely built to understand security as conceived of by social 
science and operationalized as a set of practices that occurs on and for the Internet. The framework 
has synthesized multiple levels of analysis defining conceptual layers inherent to how the Internet 
is engineered while building bridges to traditional international relations levels of theoretical 
exploration.  This framework can help drive analysis of issues related to agency, structure, identity, 
and power systematically.  Coordination, which was defined above, as the act of aligning actors’ 
goals, intentions, and actions can be observed as the evolved practice of security provisioning 
which has arisen as the Internet has been instantiated and grown.  Coordination is most 
recognizable during the threat recognition phase in which problem- solving is being engaged in 
and active discussions are occurring.  Observing practice can be achieved by analyzing the various 
indicators of practice emanating from a community of practice.  As detailed above, these indicators 
of practice may include: 
• Seeking to identify a problem and looking for a solution  
• Explicit acts of seeking out experience through social networks,  
• Reusing assets across problem-sets,  
• Coordination and synergy through combining efforts amongst actors,  
• Active discussions amongst a set of linked practitioners,  
• Documentation of process to codify skills and document resources, and  
• Mapping knowledge to identify gaps through intentional interrogation of 
knowledge networks to establish baseline understanding amongst practitioners 
 
Structure of a communities of practice and their interaction with outside elements can be defined, 
in part, through ease of communication.  Communication amongst a constituency will be easier 
when such it is routinized and habituated through repeated interaction.  When the gulf between 




coordination.  As similarities give way to differences, the chasm across which information must 
flow may deepen thus comprising a major seam which will impede coordination.  Distinguishing 
between major and minor seams can help one understand the structure and pathway of security 
provisioning specific to an event or context.  Finally, the idea of identity can be observed through 
the manner in which communities of practice adjudicate participation.  Which is to say, how do 
such communities judge who is part of their constituency and who is outside of it? Various models 
of trust will be discussed in chapter four and facets of group dynamics impacting identity will also 
be explored through various cases in chapters three and four. 
The next two chapters will utilize the framework to build an understanding how security 
communities of practice collaborate to recognize and remediate problems occurring at a large-
scale on the Internet.  Across the cases presented below, the ICIRS model is utilized, implicitly, 
as an analytic heuristic to help drive insight into the various indications of practice across threat 
recognition and security provisioning in the face of emergent threats.  In each of these cases, there 
exists a constituency of individuals that can mobilize as a response to those emergent threats based, 
in part, on their unique position embedded within the structure of the Internet’s physical, logical, 
and governance structure and their ability to utilize professional and social connections.  The 
current system which consists of distributed agency, often described as a patchwork, has evolved 
from practices emerging through security events over the course of the Internet’s history.  Chapter 
three will sketch the trajectory of that history bookended by two canonical cases before the modern 
provisioning environment is discussed in chapter four.  The issue of power will be revisited and 





CHAPTER 3. PROVISIONING SECURITY ON THE INTERNET:  A 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The Internet has evolved to become an essential human infrastructure.  So much so, that 
statement needn’t be further supported as few would argue the Internet is not central to global 
commerce, communication and a plethora of human activity.  Unsurprisingly then, security of such 
an infrastructure is an important and evolving consideration for stakeholders that range from 
individual users all the way across a spectrum to States and their constituent governments.  Given 
the inherently networked nature of the Internet, collaboration is both necessary and intuitively 
useful.  The history of collaborative security on the Internet is important to understand as it has 
conditioned, structured, and led to the current system.  Often the system is referred to as a security 
‘patchwork’ – which is to say security involves a constellation of entities that may be public, 
private, quasi-public/private including non-governmental organizations, profit seeking companies, 
non-profit parties of interest, and others all engaging both through formal agreements and informal 
arrangements both within and across international borders.  Simply put, security on/for the Internet 
is far too complex to map easily or directly.  That activity has not evolved in a vacuum, in fact it 
has a history that continuously conditions subsequent practice, the components of which were 
elucidated earlier.  Before speaking of the modern provisioning context, the following chapter will 
briefly review two canonical cases, and several taking place in the time period between the two 
that have been studied and analyzed by other authors from various analytic perspectives.  This is 
done to provide a historical context within which to understand the current dynamics present 






3.1 Morris Worm:  Security as a local concern  
November 1988 was a watershed time in the development of collaborative information 
security.  At the time, the Internet consisted of approximately 60,000 computers connected 
throughout the US and overseas. Reports of widespread shut-downs of network connected 
computers began spreading on or about 2 November.  The resulting effort to diagnose and eradicate 
the problem, which was identified as a “self-replicating, self-propagating,” piece of code authored 
by Robert Morris Jr., a graduate student at Cornell University, drew together several computer 
experts throughout academia.  The Morris Worm, as it was dubbed, provided the historic impetus 
to pursue more formalized standing institutions focused on information security.  After action 
reports estimated the worm to have infected between 5 and 10% of Internet connected computers. 
The estimated eradication costs of the worm were pegged at $98 million by the GAO.65  DARPA, 
in the wake of the Morris Worm, set up the first Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), 
which was established to provide a nexus for coordinating information security response activities 
and information dissemination.  The worm highlighted some of the coordinative weakness 
associated with the manner network management was executed on the then nascent Internet.  
Often cited in contemporaneous analysis of the incident was the observation that there was 
no “Internet-wide management.”66  The 1989 GAO report on the incident documented that 
“According to a DARPA official, decentralization provided the needed flexibility for the Internet’s 
continuing growth and evolution.”  In practice this meant universities and government agencies 
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managed their own network back-bones while no one agency was responsible for overall 
management.67  The Morris worm itself exploited security flaws in the popular UNIX operating 
system to gain access, copy itself, and then send itself to other computers. GAO analysis of the 
incident highlighted the following three vulnerabilities made apparent by the incident: 1) the lack 
of an Internet focal point for addressing security issues, 2) security weaknesses at some sites, and 
3) problems in developing distributing and installing software fixes.  The analysis also pointed out 
there were no federal statutes which “makes such conduct a crime, other laws must be applied.”68 
The relevance of this case to the present work is to demonstrate long lasting and patterned 
institutional development can result from large-scale security mobilizations due to emergent 
threats on the Internet.  Response activities, in subsequent years, reflect much of the same manner 
of collaboration as that witnessed during the Morris Worm incident.  Therefore, security response 
on and for the Internet does have a historical context that is necessary to understand, despite the 
often-raised notions of continual evolution and flux that are discussed when analyzing the space. 
One of the more interesting dynamics highlighted by reviewing writing and analysis 
published subsequent to the remediation efforts relates to how various individuals acted as sensors 
that first recognized the threat, as agents whom diagnosed the specific set of technical issues it 
represented, and then helped coordinate and execute a remediation effort.  One of those individuals 
was Eugene H. Spafford who played a central role in helping coordinate amongst academics 
studying the worm during the initial remediation effort, he later went on to create several articles 
discussing the event including a detailed timeline sourced from his own correspondence along with 
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information gathered from other participants.  Reviewing that timeline helps map the flow of 
information and the manner of collaboration which characterized the Morris Worm incident in a 
non-trivial manner.  After the Worm was initially released, a solution was found within 12 hours, 
however, the speed of worm propagation and the lack of any formal communication channel 
among the various local system administrators of Internet connected networks, meant the worm 
nevertheless spread.  In some cases, the fix was not able to be distributed due to email being 
inaccessible as a result of issues connected to the Morris Worm.  Several individuals at places like 
NASA, Perdue University, MIT and other institutions were the first to notice the issue and 
exchanged a series of messages regarding the worm. One of the earliest was from Peter Yee at 
NASA:  
“A virus is currently affecting a number of network hosts and may affect yours.  It 
is spread via the electronic mail (SMTP and Sendmail) and attacks machines 
running 4.3 and 4.2 UNIX BSD and possibly SUN 3.X machines.  The following 
are three messages which provide some background information about the virus 
and supply a fix. The fix will prevent reinfection by the virus, but it will not fix any 
damage the virus has done.”69 
 
His message went on to offer technical information regarding fixing the issue and appears in Figure 
5 below: 
                                                          






Figure 5 Example of Technical Information Shared on Phage70 
The Morris Worm, however, necessitated further analysis and remediation action due to the scale 
at which it was spreading.  Recognizing this, Spafford decided to set up a dedicated forum within 
which a closed set of participants could discuss via a mailing list. This list became known as Phage:   
“First, I have created (at Steve Bellovin's suggestion) a mailing alias at 
arthur.cs.purdue.edu named "phage."  You are all on it, unless you ask to be 
removed.  I will also add other names if you ask.”71 
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Phage was instantiated to discuss the emerging threat, but it was not the first security-based 
mailing list. Several others had already existed. These included the UNIX mailing list which was 
started by in 1984 and the TCP-IP list, named for the network protocols enabling the transition 
from ARPANET to the nascent Internet.  Shortly after Yee’s message was sent, an anonymous 
individual posted the following warning to the TCP-IP list: 
 “A Possible virus report: 
There may be a virus loose on the internet. 
Here is the gist of a message Igot [sic]: 
I'm sorry. 
Here are some steps to prevent further transmission: 
1) don't run fingerd, or fix it to not overrun its stack when reading arguments. 
2) recompile sendmail w/o DEBUG defined 
3) don't run rexecd 
Hope this helps, but more, I hope it is a hoax.”72 
 
The message is interesting as it appears to be posted by someone in touch with the virus 
writer hence the “sorry” reference. It was later revealed the anonymous poster was Andy Sudduth 
of Harvard University who had been contacted via phone by the worm’s author Robert Morris Jr.73  
According to the chronology published by Spafford in 2003, the message was unable to be 
propagated for 24 hours due to network and system overload attributable to the worm.74  Despite 
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the multiple individuals exchanging messages, it was Sprafford’s Phage list that became the most 
central discussion forum. He writes: 
“I read Keith’s mail, I forward his warning to the Usenet news.announce.important 
newsgroup to the nntp-managers mailing list, and to over 30 other site admins. This 
is the first notice most of these people get about the Worm. This group exchanges 
mail all day about progress and behavior of the Worm, and eventually becomes the 
phage mailing list based at Perdue.”75 
 
Around 11:30am, the Defense Communications Agency “inhibits the mailbridges between 
ARPA and Milnet,” which would be one of the first indications federal authorities were getting 
involved actively, though it appears the government was first informed of the issue earlier that day 
when an academic called the National Computer Security Center.  The NCSC was the successor 
to the Department of Defense Computer Security Center (DoDCSC) which was itself established 
in 1981.  While the NCSC was focused on computer security, it did not become the central 
coordinating entity during the Morris Worm incident. Instead, the post-mortem workshop 
conducted by the NCSC and attended by central figures in the remediation effort, concluded that 
the reason the Worm was “…stopped so quickly was due almost solely to the UNIX ‘old-boy’ 
network, and not due to any formal mechanism in place at the time.”76  That ‘old-boy’ network 
communicated using mailing lists like Phage and the UNIX security list in addition to phone calls 
and individual messages to spread awareness and problem-solve.  In reviewing archived messages, 
certain aspects of practice, discussed in the previous chapter, become apparent through the 
unfolding discourse amongst participants.   
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 Some of the indications of practice involve the way in which communities of practice 
reconcile legitimacy of authority and participation along with legitimacy of action and definition 
of problem, threat and other common operational level details (perhaps better stated as the 
“common operational picture” to borrow a term from military circles).  Such discussions are 
apparent when reviewing archived messages across the Phage, TCP-IP, and UNIX mailing lists.  
 Early discussions on Phage included distributing general awareness of the worm and 
clarified basic terminology. This included whether the term “worm” or “virus” should be used to 
describe the issue, and extended to the list’s name, “phage” as accurately describing the list’s 
function.  Those debates were meaningful as they helped define How to communicate the problem 
to an ever-enlarging circle of awareness, becoming less and less technical as awareness spread to 
the media and general public.  According to Spafford and others “Clarifying the terminology was 
an important aspect of later technical reports”77 and doing so was an impetus for after action reports 
and meetings.  While Phage emerged as one of the central places to exchange information, 
members of the larger UNIX security community debated if that should be the case.  Individuals 
posted messages expressing that the UNIX Security List, while recently dormant, should be 
revived and was a more appropriate vector for collaboration, and other individuals believed the 
TCP-IP list was more appropriate.  Early messages of the worm were posted on the TCP-IP list 
and the debates as to the legitimacy of any these places as the central collaborative space continued 
throughout the remediation effort.  In addition, users debated the line between transparency and 
                                                          




necessity of confidentiality.  One Mike Crawford posted to the Phage list that “unneighbourly” 
sites were hoarding information.  Another list participant wrote: 
“One thing about this list: it was assembled hastily for an emergency purpose. Great 
thanks to Gene Spafford for creating it! As an emergency list, however, it has a 
large number of bad addresses on it (or shutdown mailers :-) At some point, we 
should retire this list, and re-create the security mailing list. While people may agree 
or disagree about whether the security list should be ``secure'' (and please let's not 
rehash all of this again here), we should remember that this list is _not_ secure. Not 
that this was a problem, since the more information that could be distributed on the 
virus, the better. But some people may disagree about whether this is appropriate 
for general security discussions.”78 
 
That participant, Theodore Ts’o was concerned that “…if anyone discovers any other holes, they 
could reuse parts of the virus to build a new one” arguing that posting technical details of the 
worm’s inner workings could be dangerous.  These discussions extended past the immediate 
remediation efforts and later in the waning days of the Phage List’s active life, participants engaged 
in further debate as to whom should be privy to the discussions.  Spafford asked the larger 
community if he should add a New York Times reporter, John Markoff to the list:   
 
“I told him that would be up to all of you.  He promised that he would not print 
anything obtained from the list without prior approval of the author(s) involved.  I 
indicated that I would not add him to the list if there was significant negative 
reaction from any of the current members of the list.”79 
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The consensus was that the reporter should not be added, and other security concerns related how 
the various security related mailing lists, not just Phage, should be managed continued.  In fact, 
specific differences within the community, between security through transparency and security 
through confidentiality led to defection away from the UNIX Security –List and the establishment 
of a new list named Zardoz.  One of the first posts by that list’s administrator, Lyle McElhaney, 
sketched several debates which presaged larger issues that the information security community 
and industry are still trying to reconcile thirty years later!  Quoting one Doug Gwen, he writes “I 
am in favor of broadcasting information about UNIX problems, security or otherwise, as WIDELY 
as possible. Yank your dial-ins if you want security.”80  McElhaney goes on to state that while he 
agrees with that sentiment, some security is necessary. He then writes the following:   
“Assuming we have to have some security then, first: who gets the list?  In my 
original message, I referred to root users only.  Several people have pointed out that 
there are others who need the data; bonafide consultants, people doing security 
development work, and so on.  Then there's the other side: with micros abounding 
on the net, anyone can be a root.  Many people with their own machines also have 
access to large machines, whose owners might not appreciate them knowing how 
to mangle their system.”81  
 
These issues, whom to trust and how to judge and extend trust are issues that modern information 
security communities of practice still wrestle with in the modern era and will be discussed in 
chapter four. 
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3.1.2 Knowledge preservation, communication and distribution 
One important dynamic to note was the apparent organic emergence of individuals that 
consolidated and summarized information that they then posted to the list as a means of knowledge 
preservation, sharing for awareness and action.  The early messages discussed above shared 
technical information regarding the worm and proposed fixes.  Individuals emerged as connected 
nodes providing a means of coordination.  These posts are not excerpted here, however, when 
reviewed and coded for content with regards to indications of practice, the messages help paint a 
comprehensive picture of an existing security community of practice, referenced above as a UNIX 
“old boy’s” club reconciling with the implications of a new threat/issue while also evolving in 
response to that issue to remediate and problem-solve.  For example, multiple posts summarized 
information as the event unfolded, questions were posted and answered to help identify best 
practices and solutions, and further debates were had over the crowded palimpsest of issues and 
implications flowing from the Morris Worm’s release and effects.82  The community itself 
recognized the importance of preserving knowledge and carrying forward lessons learned from the 
experienced (though the effectiveness of those lessons learned measures continue to be questioned 
years after83).  One way this happened was through the academic process.  Sprafford, Yee, Ts’o 
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and others who were central players in the remediation effort all went on to publish both academic 
and trade articles detailing all aspects of the Morris Worm, from technical analysis of its inner 
workings to chronologies and discussions of the effort to organize a response.  The Phage list 
helped coordinate those initial efforts as well, Spafford posted the following message: 
“Would each of you take a few moments to jot down the history of when the bug 
hit you, when you got news of patches to keep it out, when you eliminated all copies 
of the worm, times & names of other significant discoveries/discoverers, etc?  
Before this all slips from our minds, I'd like to coordinate a global history of how 
this thing hit and how we beat it.  If you lost and files, tell me that too.  Figures on 
numbers of infected machines, highest single load, etc will all be much appreciated.  
Once I collate it all, I will circulate the master history back to everyone who 
contributes information for it.”84 
 
Additionally NCSC/DARPA sponsored a workshop aimed at discussing and documenting 
the response effort while also trying to plan a path forward.  Individuals on the various mailing 
lists such as Phage, Zardoz, and others distributed word of the meeting and several key players 
attended.  The central outcome of that meeting was the establishment of a Computer Emergency 
Response Team or CERT that would be funded through DARPA and implemented at Carnegie 
Mellon University.  The CERT was meant to serve as a central response point for future network 
based security issues the existing mailing lists were used to inform the community of the new 
entity.85  By late 1988 Phage’s usefulness was winding down, members of the core group involved 
in the Morris Worm activities looked to consolidate continued security collaboration on other, 
more general lists, for example Spafford posted the following to the group:   
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“Andrew Burt has started to mail things out to his list, and the security list at zardoz 
seems to be alive and well.  Specific security holes and fixes should be addressed 
to those lists in the future.  If you aren't subscribed to those lists, you should 
consider doing so (could the moderators of those two lists post something to this 
list on how people can join?.”86 
 
The Morris Worm served, not only as a galvanizing moment in which network information security 
became an important point of discussion, but also served to clearly show elements of a nascent 
Internet security community of practice and thus discernible culture.  That nascent community of 
practice included elements easily bucketed across the layers within the ICIRS model and seams 
are identifiable.  
Clearly, in terms of the Morris Worm, fundamental security issues of integrity and 
availability during the processing and transmission phases of the information cycle were 
compromised.  Post-event, the Morris Worm undermined assumptions of data integrity and fueled 
questions of repudiation about an evolving system of communication that was emerging as an 
important and relied upon technology.  Both major and minor seams are clearly present across the 
threat recognition and the remediation phases of the event.  Both recognizing that there was a threat 
and the subsequent response relied upon traversing minor seams through leveraging messages 
amongst small groups of socially connected individuals.  Major seams between network 
administrators and larger government entities constrained the effectiveness of the efforts initially 
due to an immature and, in large part, non-existing national response mechanism.  The next section 
will help fill in the timeline between the Morris Worm in 1989 and Conficker Botnet in 2008.  This 
                                                          





discussion isn’t a comprehensive history, though it will highlight major threats within the realm of 
malware as they evolved in the intervening time period. 
3.2 Seams Multiply:  Explosive Growth, Professionalization, and Evolving Threat  
If there is one characteristic that describes the Internet longitudinally through time from 
the 1988 Morris Worm incident to the present, that characteristic is obviously, and easily growth.  
Growth in the breadth of connected networks, in users, in commerce, and in activity has been the 
most obvious descriptive term associated with the Internet.  As that growth has happened and the 
Internet has become ever more central to the infrastructure of human endeavor, so too has threat 
grown and security of that infrastructure has become a task given to professionalization and ever 
more specialization.  In using the ICIRS model to guide and segment the history of that security 
evolution, it becomes apparent that the very structure of the Internet is intrinsically linked to the 
way in which that professionalization and specialization has bred and operationalized the practice 
of security.  From the perspective of governance of core Internet infrastructure, the history of that 
growth and its implications has been well documented and analyzed by authors such as Mueller 
and DeNardis.87  As such, the history of the Internet’s core governance features need not be retread 
here.  However, the core institutional arrangements and histories associated with entities such the 
Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and others are all important to note.  In 
terms of the ICIRS model, the non-profit, trans-national, governance mechanisms do interact with 
the information centered security model as it is projected upward through the levels of analysis.  
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They also overlap, in terms of membership and social circles involved with the community of 
practice defined below in various case studies.  Instead, the focus of the next section is to help 
sketch the operational level of practitioners that link the more abstract governance institutions to 
the practice of security and continued operation on the ground.  That patchwork response 
mechanism has been less explicitly mapped nor well operationalized in social science and policy 
literature, though parts and pieces have been referenced, albeit lightly.  The evolution of what this 
dissertation references as a “community of practice” has been co-constituted over the course of the 
Internet’s growth, and the following section will sketch some development through brief targeted 
discussion of select cases. 
 Post Morris Worm there was a recognized need, within the United States, to amend the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 to clarify specific language and meanings that became 
central to the prosecution of Robert Morris Jr. during the legal proceedings of the incident, though 
he was successfully prosecuted under the original law.  The act was amended in 1996.  Between 
1996 and 2000, the Internet exploded across a number of metrics including users, traffic volume, 
and geographic access coverage.  New electronic information centric terms entered into the 
world’s written/spoken vernacular.  These terms such as “cyber,” “information superhighway,” 
“net,” and many others ushered in a new era of discussion, culture, economic activity, and 
unavoidably, security concern.  Before describing the modern provisioning environment and the 
complexity of the modern Internet, a few post Morris Worm incidents will be briefly explored to 
help fill in the timeline between 1989 and 2008. 
3.2.1 1992 – Michelangelo Virus 
After the Morris Worm the threat to information on and through the Internet increased both 




and viruses that captured public attention and further evolved the communities of practice 
surrounding threat recognition, remediation, and related activities.   
In 1992 international news media fixated on possible damage that could be done by a newly 
discovered threat dubbed the Michelangelo Virus due to it being programmed to execute on “any 
March 6” which is the birthday of the Renaissance artist, though there was no reference to the artist 
within the virus itself.  The newly formed CERT issued the following statement in the alert it sent 
out  
“The Michelangelo virus triggers on any March 6. On that date, the virus overwrites 
critical system data, including boot and file allocation table (FAT) records, on the 
boot disk (floppy or hard), rendering the disk unusable. Recovering user data from 
a disk damaged by the Michelangelo virus will be very difficult. 88 
 
The virus is less notable for the actual damage it caused and better known for the hysteria, which 
ensued that consequently drove sales of anti-virus software and further established the computer 
virus in the public imagination.  An IBM report notes, “…people did find the Michelangelo virus, 
but they found far more viruses of other kinds.  The Stoned virus, for instance, the most prevalent 
virus at the time, was found about three times more frequently than was the Michelangelo virus.”89  
The virus helped further establish a security industry that marketed to the public’s fear of possible 
damage done via computer virus and worms, which may have contributed to a general lack of 
concern before the Melissa Virus hit in 1999.  That virus will be highlighted next. 
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3.2.2 1999 – Melissa Virus 
Often cited in the history of computer viruses and worms is the Melissa Virus.  The 1999 
CERT alert sent out to warn the public stated the following:   
At approximately 2:00 PM GMT-5 on Friday March 26, 1999 we began receiving 
reports of a Microsoft Word 97 and Word 2000 macro virus which is propagating 
via email attachments. The number and variety of reports we have received indicate 
that this is a widespread attack affecting a variety of sites. 
 
One of the characteristics that made the Melissa Virus such a notable threat is the rapidity with 
which it spread.  Testifying before the Subcommittee on Technology in the House of 
Representatives, Keith A. Rhodes said:  
“Melissa showed just how quickly viruses can proliferate due to the intricate and 
extensive connectivity of today’s networks in just days after the virus was unleashed, 
there were widespread reports of infections across the country. Worse yet, as the 
virus made its way through the Internet, variations appeared that were able to bypass 
security software designed to detect Melissa. These two factors alone made it 
extremely difficult to launch countermeasures for the infection.”90 
 
Mr. Rhodes testimony also offers a small bit of information pointing back toward the importance 
of private elements of the burgeoning private security community of practice.  He testified 
“Melissa showed how hard it is to trace any virus back to its source.”  Authorities had believed 
that an individual with the online handle “VicodinES” distributed the virus via an America Online 
(AOL) account, however with a tip originating from the same service, investigators discovered 
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that this account was allegedly stolen by the suspect arrested for creating the virus.  Without this 
level of cooperation, the suspect might not have ever been identified.  Even before the account was 
revealed to be stolen, the initial investigation into the author of the virus was helped along 
substantially by private constituencies.  A 1999 article in the New York Times details that one 
Richard Smith, the president of Phar Lap Software, helped track the virus origins:   
“Mr. Smith found indications that the virus is a work of a programmer -- or possibly 
a small group -- who wrote and distributed a similar program two years ago. 
Moreover, by searching the World Wide Web, he has found clues to the identity of 
the programmers and even more striking evidence that could lead the authorities to 
the computer on which the program was written. 
Today Mr. Smith turned that information over to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. Paul Bresson, an F.B.I. spokesman, would say only, ''We have a case 
that's open and we're actively investigating the virus.'' Distributing a computer virus 
is a Federal crime.”91 
 
Like the Morris worm before, threat recognition and remediation were again coordinated, in part, 
via online mailing lists.  The Times reported that Mr. Smith “…collected that information and 
posted it to an internet news group that discusses software viruses.  Later that evening he received 
a response from a Swedish computer science graduate student…”  That student was Fred Björck 
and he recognized similarities between what Mr. Smith posted and a virus author known to him.92  
Mr. Björck suggested to Mr. Smith that metadata associated with MS Word documents could be 
used to help determine where the virus originated and could be used for attribution.  While 
VicodinES was identified, the virus was released via AOL to the alt.sex newsgroup by David Smith 
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(no relation to the earlier Richard Smith).  The confusion over the identity of VicodinES and 
whether or not David Smith was one and the same or, as it turned out, a separate individual pointed 
to the immaturity of law enforcement’s ability to execute technical investigations.  It also 
reinforced the role technical communities of practice continued to play in the evolving threat 
environment a decade post Morris Worm.  This provides further evidence of the major seam 
between public law enforcement and private technical communities of practice that had existed 
during Morris Worm, and continues to the persist today.  In the Melissa case, the collaboration 
between Mr. Björck, a grad student in Sweden, and Richard Smith who was a private business 
owner in the US, led to the FBI being able to track down and prosecute a guilty party.  According 
to the FBI, the virus had caused more than $80 million in damage.93  The virus’ originator was 
sentenced to 20 months in jail and prevented from participating on online forums and using a 
computer network for a period of time without the court’s permission.  Mr. Smith wasn’t sentenced 
until 2002 and in the intervening period after his arrest he provided extensive help to the FBI.  He 
posed online under a false name and communicated with other virus authors and was instrumental 
in helping authorities with other cases (including the 2001 Anna Kournikova Virus mentioned 
below).”94  The 2002 FBI press release noted both AOL for its assistance and ICSA.net of Reston, 
VA for technical assistance “…which included an analysis of damage caused by the Melissa 
virus.” 95  ICSA.net was one several private companies coordinating with members of the security 
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community via discussion groups and providing assistance to the authorities.96  ICSA.net is worth 
discussing further as an example of the continued professionalization and specialization of 
information security. 
 ICSA was founded in 1989 by David Kennedy, the company became an early purveyor of 
security related software and services.  Reporting from the time during and after the Melissa virus 
helps discern some of the early indicators of developing practice and establishment of a burgeoning 
community of practice.  The Wall Street Journal reported:  “Viewing its mission as 
counterintelligence in a game of guerrilla warfare, the company is unusually aggressive among 
antivirus researchers.”97  It goes on to say, “The IS-Recon agents [a reference to ICSA employees] 
can hide their identities while communicating with virus writers over the Internet.  They keep tabs 
on messages on Internet news groups such as alt.comp.virus…”  ICSA.net is an example of 
individuals within a company developing technical knowledge and relationships across industry 
and constituencies in the same manner that network engineers (at places like CloudFlare) will be 
detailed below the case of BGP routing.  The same article describes ICSA.net in the following 
manner:   
“The team is an eclectic mix. Spread throughout the U.S. and connected via 
computer, the team includes the police-trained Mr. Kennedy as well as other experts 
in information gathering, including a former journalist. There's an academically 
oriented computer expert, a so-called virus "zoo-keeper" who has samples of 
31,000 viruses, and a couple of recent college graduates young enough to look and 
act the part of virus writers. The agents work on computers that can't be traced to 
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the company, and the zookeeper, Bruce Hughes, uses software programs dubbed 
"bots" to scour the Internet for activity at sites operated by virus writers.”98 
 
ICSA.net went on to become a central player in the emerging specialized information security 
products and services industry.  The company was eventually merged with another before being 
bought by Verizon, the company currently still exists as an independent division of Verizon under 
the name ICSA Labs.  The arch of its history, given that it was founded in 1989 mirrors the 
expansion, professionalization and subsequent specialization that has characterized the 
information security space.  As the Internet grew explosively, individuals within the security field 
developed ever more specialized knowledge, skills, and seams across which such professionals 
coordinate have multiplied and grown.  Before discussing the modern provisioning space in 
chapter four, several more notable security events will be discussed.  
3.2.2 2000 – ILOVEYOU Worm 
On 4 May 2000, yet another newly released threat laid claim to the title “fastest spreading” 
and “most damaged caused”.99  Like the viruses and worms explored above, this one too spread 
through email, and also by making use of an attachment which held a Visual Basic script.  The 
worm itself was not sophisticated in terms of code, but it did play on the social proclivities of 
people in order to propagate.  The subject line contained the words “I Love You” and the email 
body implored individuals to open the attachment. The worm then emailed itself to all the 
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addresses within a user’s address book using the Microsoft Outlook program.100  It should be noted 
that the academic and technical community during and following the ILOVEYOU worm incident 
seemed to be at odds at how to classify the threat, some wanted to use the term virus others the 
term worm.  This represents an ongoing indication of practice as the community surrounding 
computer security worked to develop a vernacular of common definition.  Eugene Spafford, known 
from the Morris Worm incident and by then a popular academic authority on computer security, 
made the following distinction during Congressional testimony:  
“Unlike viruses, worms are programs that can run independently and travel from 
machine to machine across network connections; worms may have portions of 
themselves running on many different machines. Worms do not necessarily change 
other programs, although they may carry other code that does, such as a true virus. 
It is this replication behavior that leads some people to believe that worms are a 
form of virus, especially those people using Cohen's formal definition of virus 
(which also would classify automated network patch programs as viruses).101 
 
The testimony hints at the one of the larger seams across which threat recognition and remediation 
must occur and overcome during this time period, largely due to the increasing scale of damage. 
That seam is between the general public and the technical community.  Issues of how to 
communicate threat and discussing collective language to do so highlights an indication of 
practice, namely evidence of specialized language and communication firmly establishing within 
the burgeoning community.  The ILOVEYOU worm is useful to highlight for another reason which 
is the international coordinative impediments and prosecutorial failures associated with the case.  
Despite the coordinative mechanisms put in place since the Morris Worm incident and the 
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maturing security awareness amongst governments, corporations, and the public, the ILOVEYOU 
worm still caught the Internet, as a whole, unaware and unprepared.  Take for instance testimony 
given before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs by Jack Brock the director for Government wide and Defense Information Systems:   
However, the NIPC had less success with the ILOVEYOU virus. As noted earlier 
(in figure 1), the NIPC first learned of the virus at 5:45 a.m. EDT from an industry 
source. Over the next 2 hours, the “NIPC checked other sources in attempts to 
verify the initial information with limited success. According to NIPC officials, no 
information had been produced by intelligence, Defense, and law enforcement 
sources, and only one reference was located in open sources, such as Internet 
websites. The NIPC considers assessment of virus reports to be an important step 
before issuing an alert because most viruses turn out to be relatively harmless or 
are detected and defeated by existing antivirus software. According to the NIPC, 
the commercial antivirus community identifies about 20 to 30 new viruses every 
day, and more than 53,000 named viruses have been identified to date. At 7:40 a.m., 
two DOD sources notified the NIPC that the virus was spreading through the 
department’s computer systems, and the NIPC immediately notified the Federal 
Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC), at GSA, and CERT-CC. FedCIRC 
then undertook a rigorous effort to notify agency officials via fax and phone.”102 
 
This points back towards the necessity of commercial, private, and academic constituencies to 
recognize and characterize the emerging threats before government law enforcement and other 
public resources could mobilize.  The authors of the ILOVEYOU worm were identified as a 
Philippine nationals Onel de Guzman and Reonel Ramones.  The two were identified as part of a 
group of “hackers” known as GRAMMERSoft, providing services to small businesses and 
allegedly selling homework to other students at AMA Computer College in the Philippines.  US 
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and European authorities both desired to try the perpetrators in Western courts as much of the 
damage (much of it manifested as loss of productivity) had occurred in Western governments and 
corporations.  However, the Philippines lacked the necessary laws to charge them.  Thereby 
nobody was prosecuted for the incident.103  The incident led directly to the Philippines updating 
their information technology and security laws to address computer crime, much in the same way 
the Morris Worm incident forced change in the US.  The incident highlighted much of the same 
sort of ad-hoc coordination present during previous events, just at a much larger scale and within 
multiple communities of practice.  Recalling the event for the BBC one information security 
specialist was quoted saying “When I hung up my phone and looked at the screen, it showed that 
I had received and missed 40+ phone calls during that 30-minute conference call," he was further 
quoted, "All those calls were coming in from partners, vendors and media…Everybody wanted to 
know what was happening and how to fight the outbreak”104  One of the things that ILOVEYOU 
presaged was the oncoming torrent of malicious email spam which would characterize a new era 
of computer crime. 
3.2.3 2003 – SQL Slammer 
In 2003 the SQL Slammer worm infected more than ninety per cent of vulnerable hosts 
(computers connected to the Internet and susceptible to the threat) within ten minutes of being 
released.  While again unprecedented in the speed and scale compared to what came before, 
Slammer was particularly alarming in that it spread faster than human scale response times could 
manage, causing significant damage to financial organizations, travel systems, and 
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governments.105  Even more interesting, SQL Slammer was modeled after a proof of concept 
academic exercise in which the original author disclosed the vulnerability to Microsoft whose 
software the Slammer virus exploited.  David Litchfield was responsible for finding the original 
exploit and he writes: “Coding an exploit up I sent a copy of it to the Microsoft Security Response 
Center (secure@microsoft.com) with a short write up of my findings then proceeded to own all of 
our client’s SQL Servers.”106  Afterward, Litchfield contacted Microsoft to ask if he could present 
the newly found vulnerability at the yearly Blackhat security conference, Microsoft assented 
noting that there would be an available patch by that time.  While presenting at the conference 
Litchfield implored his audience to install the patch.  Six months later an unknown entity used the 
code Litchfield presented in the Slammer virus which crashed Microsoft’s SQL server product 
while also generating a random IP address to which the virus would propagate further.107  The 
resulting quick propagating virus clogged networks causing failures of airline, banking, and even 
emergency services infrastructure around the world.  An analysis of Slammer noted that it had 
infected more than 75,000 hosts within a few minutes of its release despite the fact that it was a 
known vulnerability that had been demonstrated and Microsoft had released a patch beforehand.108  
Slammer is useful in that it demonstrates the manner in which the security community of practice 
is intrinsically related to the threat-scape.  Members of the security community, such as David 
Litchfield, work to find exploits and publicize them through interactions and knowledge sharing 
such as presenting at Blackhat.  However, that very same vector serves to inform the adversaries 
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as well.  That dynamic will be further discussed later in this dissertation.  Slammer’s code was 
rather unsophisticated, though Litchfield notes that virus’ author did not make the code as efficient 
and short as possible and further notes differences across the code in utilizing the exclusive or 
(XOR) function may indicate that the virus had at least two separate authors.  This act of 
deconstructing code for the sake of attribution (even though, in this case, nothing came of it) shows 
another central responsibility of the third-party technical contributors across the Internet security 
community of practice.   
3.2.4 2004 – MyDoom, SoBig, Sasser and the Monetization 
2004 represented a new era in Internet security and ushered in the realization that previous 
computer worms and viruses spread through the Internet had been rather quaint next to what was 
on the horizon.  What was the change signaling the new era?  Money.  The MyDoom and SoBig 
pieces of malware did not represent the sorts of viruses and worms that had come before, these 
new threats were purpose built and represented the introduction of an organized criminal element 
focused on making money through surreptitious control of infected computers.  Controlling 
networks of infected computers meant those captured resources could be directed, in a for-hire 
fashion, to send out email spam or create on demand distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks.  
Their arrival heralded the end to an era in which computer worms and viruses were written and 
released as demonstrations of skill or for thrill, and instead indicated that malware would become 
a commodity through which crime could be conducted and criminals could earn money.  MyDoom, 
in particular, spread faster than SQL Slammer but while Slammer simply propagated, MyDoom 
turned infected computers into zombies and targeted specific websites, initially that of SCO 




MyDoom and SoBig as the events marking virus writing as a commercial enterprise.109  MyDoom 
originated in Russia and the original variant of the worm was intended to launch a denial of service 
attack against the SCO Corporation, possibly as retaliation of the company’s copyright claims 
against parts of the Linux operating system’s open-source code-base.110  SCO offered a $250,000 
reward for information leading to prosecution of the worm’s authors, and Microsoft later also 
offered reward money.  While the rewards did not lead to an arrest, the technique was successful 
for Microsoft in other cases in 2004.  Microsoft’s $250,000 bounty that it offered with regard to 
the Sasser Worm, another piece of malware emerging in 2004, led to the arrest of Sven Jaschan, a 
German minor who was turned in by two friends motivated by the pay-out.  The Sasser incident 
also provides a brief insight into the way international law enforcement collaboration for cyber 
investigations was evolving.  The FBI posted the following on their website in October 2005 
describing the investigation into Sasser after Mr. Jaschnan had been identified though his friends:  
“The student had erased vital evidence on his computer. How to link him to the crime?”111  The 
FBI went on to state “The cyber saboteur admitted sending the malicious code to an acquaintance 
through a U.S.-based instant messaging service. German authorities called us...and we contacted 
the messaging service, enabling us to trace the transmission to a specific IP address.  Then, German 
investigators used the information to make the direct link to the student.”112 
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Over the course of the ensuing months 2004 - 2006, MyDoom variants began to show up, 
each of which added new IP addresses to target various other entities proving its utility as a 
“directed” DDOS “weapon.”  Similarly, SoBig also created networks of infected computers that 
could be directed, these networks are known as “botnets” and have become a focused concern 
amongst security professionals ever since (botnets are discussed in much further detail later within 
this work).  The control of both MyDoom and SoBig were fought over by various criminal 
elements vying for command and control of the networks through the release of variants, ostensibly 
to sell for denial of service attacks and to send out email spam.   
 
3.2.5 2008 – Conficker 
 The Conficker Botnet represents one of the most studied modern coordinated incident 
response cases within the information security space.  The case has been studied from technical 
and social science academic perspectives, been reported about extensively in popular news media, 
and there exists an account of the effort in popular mass marketed book form.  Thereby its usage 
here is to leverage those established narratives to understand the event from the perspective of 
social practice.  In fact, the availability of these various accounts is a valuable indication of 
practice, central figures within the remediation effort interviewed for this dissertation made clear 
that circulating information about Conficker and participating in efforts to spread the story were 
intentional on their part so as to institutionalize knowledge and codify normative response 
mechanisms.113  The book is named Worm:  The First Digital World War  and was written by 
                                                          




Mark Bowden.114  The book names a number of individuals that played roles within the effort to 
respond, but the book also leaves a number of specific names out.  According to interviews done 
for this dissertation with key individuals within the cohort of names that do not appear, Mark 
Bowden was approached due to his previous work that looked at US Special Operations soldiers.  
He was asked to obfuscate the identities of certain individuals he interviewed and allowed to use 
details without explicitly identifying them.115  The individuals involved in the effort to grant 
Bowden access to key communities of practice and central players wanted the story of Conficker 
to be publicized and memorialized both as a deterrent and as way to help institutionalize the various 
lessons learned.116  Not only was the avenue of a book length account undertaken but the 
constituency involved decided to permanently host various artifacts and information pertinent to 
the Conficker case online as a way to document the effort.  The Department of Homeland Security 
funded the Rendon Group to research and publish a lessons learned document, also available on 
the Conficker Working Group’s website.  Specific segments of the operational security community 
will be discussed later in chapter four but first, the Conficker case will be broadly outlined to help 
round out the historical context in which information security communities of practice have arisen 
since the advent of the Morris Worm. 
The Conficker effort is often cited as a template of sorts on how private, public, domestic, 
and international constituencies establish ad-hoc coordination to respond to a widespread Internet 
threat.  Conficker was first noticed infecting computers in November of 2008 (Conficker A) and a 
second variant named Conficker B began showing up on infected computers in December 2008.  
Eventually five separate variants of Conficker would be identified.  The Conficker malware was 
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engineered to create a botnet.  Botnets consists of computer code placed on machines (usually) 
owned or operated by a separate party to utilize that machine’s processing power for one’s own 
purposes, often illegal or nefarious in nature.  One of the things that made Conficker more 
dangerous than previous botnets was the method it used to coordinate and control the network of 
computers it infected.  Early versions of Conficker would attempt to “reach-out” to 250 “pseudo-
randomly generated domains” each day, the domains were spread across eight Top Level Domains 
(TLDs).  A TLD is defined as the last segment of a domain name such as ‘.com’, ‘.net’, ‘.org’ or 
others.  This tactic helped ensure that command and control (C&C) of the botnet was able to stay 
ahead of typical remediation methods which would simply block the handful of C&C servers 
which typically would be utilized to direct more run of the mill botnets.  This fact meant combating 
Conficker necessitated registering the domains as they were being created in order to “sinkhole,” 
essentially taking control of, Conficker’s C&C infrastructure.  That task was first done by hand by 
a select few early responders within the constituency of aware and able-bodied security 
practitioners.  However, that strategy was fast seen as insufficient and requiring too great a degree 
of collaboration.117  The Rendon Group’s report details the beginning of the larger effort.  A 
Microsoft employee contacted the domain name registrar, Neustar that operated the .biz domain 
and asked their help to register a large block of .biz domains in order to stay ahead of Conficker.  
Rodney Joffe at Neustar then, in turn, contacted ICANN to request they waive the mandatory 
registration fees.  This led to a robust agreement with ICANN and “Since that time, ICANN has 
instituted a formal process for registry operators to request a fee be waived when dealing with an 
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attack on the DNS system.”118  This brought several different constituencies into contact with each 
other:  Microsoft whose software was exploited by Conficker, domain name registries that 
administer the process of registering new domains, ICANN that oversees and governs that process, 
security professionals within private companies, and academics that study and practice information 
security.  As noted by the Rendon Group, this was not the first time such collaboration had ensued, 
the cases detailed above make that clear.  What Conficker represented was a new scale and degree 
of collaboration.  That collaboration was established, in part, due to a wider realization within the 
information security space that the community needed to be more proactive against the evolving 
threats present on the Internet.119  The community had tried to organize a response to another 
botnet earlier in 2008 named Srizbi, which was responsible for alarming amount of spam email.  
However, that effort was seen as a failure due to a lack of close coordination between involved 
parties along with an inability to sustain the effort to register domains used for Srizbi’s C&C due 
to insufficient funds on the part of the coordination entity, security firm FireEye.120   
 With regards to Conficker, initial efforts at organizing by a small group of involved 
individuals coincided with a conference on DNS security being held in Atlanta, GA in early 
February of 2009.  Initial work on registering Conficker domains had begun in late January, but 
the conference served as a meeting place to discuss Conficker and resulted in a partnership 
amongst a core group of individuals representing several organizations.  That initial group then 
formed the Conficker Working Group (CWG), the members of which are listed in table 2.   
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Table 2:  Members of the Conficker Working Group121 
Member Description 
1and1 German web hosting company 
Afilias US based top level domain registry 
America Online (AOL) US based internet service and content provider 
Cisco US based enterprise level hardware manufacturer  
ESET Canadian provider of antivirus and security software/solutions 
F-Secure Finnish cyber security and privacy company 
Facebook US based social network platform provider 
Georgia Institute of 
Technology 
US State university and research organization 
Global Domains 
International 
US based domain name registrar 
IBM US based provider of hardware/software and enterprise business solutions 
ICANN Governance organization responsible for the DNS system  
Internet Storm Center 
(ISC) 
Nonprofit entity of the SANS (Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies) that relies on an all-
volunteer effort to detect and analyze problems on the Internet.  
Internet Systems US based security software company 
IT-ISAC Non-profit entity that facilitates information sharing within the IT sector 
Juniper Networks US based provider of network software and enterprise network hardware 
Kaspersky Russian based antivirus and security company 
MacAfee US based antivirus and security company 
Microsoft US based provider of operating systems and variety of productivity and other software and 
hardware 
Neustar US based internet security company 
NIC Chile Chilean administrator of the .CL domain 
OpenDNS Company and service which extend the DNS system and provides security solutions 
SecureWorks US based security solutions company now owned by Dell 
Shadowserver US based non-profit which helps provide server space for sinkholing operations 
Sophos UK based security software and hardware company 
SRI International US base non-profit scientific research organization 
Support Intelligence Security software and intelligence provider 
Symantec Antivirus and security solutions provider 
Team Cymru US based security non-profit that provides a variety of security services centered on the Internet 
Trend Micro US based security solutions provider 
Verisign US based operator of network infrastructure including a number of Internet root servers 
In addition to working with US based domain registrars, the working group coordinated with the 
Chinese (.cn) domain registrar.  Contact was made with the Chinese domain administrators that 
themselves are closely aligned with the Chinese government, in fact, getting China to cooperate 
proved easier than anticipated.  Once that agreement was obtained, the Chinese were able to 
quickly block necessary domains, including ones that were already registered by another party.  
This fact was due to the level of control China exerts over its TLD domain and may not have been 
                                                          




possible within other countries.122  The captured domains were redirected to a set of servers, which 
at first, were operated independently among various involved parties.  Microsoft announced the 
existence of the CWG publicly on 12 February 2009 while also offering a $250,000 reward for 
information leading to the arrest of Conficker’s author.   
 Interestingly and tellingly, the CWG did not formally coordinate with the US Government 
in any great measure.  The following paragraph is quoted from the Rendon Group report and is an 
important and often cited justification for indicating the non-public, ad-hoc, nature of information 
security provisioning on and for the Internet: 
“There were few formal contacts with the US government as an institution, but a 
large number of connections through personal channels. Several researchers within 
the Conficker Working Group, without coordinating with others, communicated 
through their own social networks with the FBI, DHS, DoD and various intelligence 
agencies. Questions were asked about how law enforcement could help and whether 
the group could help law enforcement. Later, law enforcement agencies from a 
number of countries placed representatives on the Working Group lists so they 
could follow developments, but these agencies were unable or unwilling to formally 
contribute to the group (though collaboration with specific individuals may have 
occurred)”123. 
The CWG did coordinate amongst themselves regularly, scheduling calls and exchanging 
messages electronically.  The lessons learned portion of the Rendon report points out how this 
regularly scheduled contact was deemed a key factor to the CWG’s successes.  The “day to day” 
tactical workings of the CWG consisted of checking on the status of registered domains, making 
sure legitimate traffic wasn’t impacted, generating reports, and in some cases, interacting with both 
the public and other parties to convey information and update progress.  It is noted in the after-
action report that most individuals with the CWG were volunteers lending their time above and 






beyond their normal “day jobs.”  The CWG also experienced internal tensions as various parties 
within the CWG spoke independently of each other to the public and the media.  Concerns brought 
about by other parties not participating directly in the group discussing their own remediation plans 
also helped dictate when Microsoft decided to announce the CWG.  Coordinating attempts to 
manage public relations proved difficult:  “At one point, people questioned why they could not 
talk to the media when they knew others in the group were briefing the government or private 
sector clients on the threat. This issue was never fully resolved.”124 
 The Conficker case is an important milestone in the history of collaborative Internet 
security.  It represents a culmination of the various practices established over the course of the post 
Morris Worm history of information security provisioning.  In addition, it helps substantiate one 
of the central claims of this dissertation.  That being the claim security communities of practice 
are products of an ever-evolving security culture that changes in response to threats and lessons 
learned during critical security events.  Evidence for this is embedded within accounts of Conficker 
that note there was a shift prior to that effort within the operational security community toward a 
more proactive posture.  Where was that shift happening, where does the operational security 
community exist?  It exists, in part, as a social network built upon online communication and in-
person interaction at conferences and other events.  It will be discussed further below in chapter 
four.   
  





CHAPTER 4. THE MODERN SECURITY PROVISIONING SPACE 
The following chapter helps understand the modern security provisioning space as 
interpreted through the ICIRS model and after establishing the historical context reviewed in 
chapter three.  That environment includes several more institutionalized mechanisms than were in 
place during the Morris Worm incident and also includes parts that have evolved through and since 
the Conficker experience.  The following chapter isn’t chronological in arrangement, instead it is 
divided into five sections.  The first section seeks to further explain and operationalize the way in 
which individuals and entities are embedded within the logical layer of the ICIRS model as 
consequence of the Internet’s topology, the second section provides a discreet example of how 
those embedded entities result in a community of practice executing a task, in this case remediating 
a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue.  The third section considers a particular type of security 
provisioning activity called a “take-down” within the context of the Internet’s operational security 
community of practice.  The fourth section looks at the case of the Mariposa botnet to understand 
the post-Conficker world, and the fifth section holistically analyzes data gathered across twenty-
eight incidents spanning the last twelve years.  In doing so, the security community of practice is 
further substantiated, important seams and communities are characterized, discussed and 
understood.  
4.1 Topology and Complexity 
As the Internet itself became more complex, the various top-level autonomous systems 
(AS) over the course of the 1990s and 2000s multiplied and became far more interconnected.  
Evidence of the topological complexity and evolution is obvious from perusing data produced by 




graphs.  An AS references an independent “autonomous system” that identifies itself to other 
autonomous systems.  These systems then route packets addressed to entities within that AS 
independently.  The system that controls the identification and routing of data between various AS 
is called border gateway protocol (BGP) and will be further described later in this work.  For now, 
however, there are two important dynamics to understand that are conveyed by Table 3.  The first 
is the increase in the number of autonomous systems and the second is the interconnection of the 
systems in terms of the traffic polled/collected to visualize its snapshot in time.   
Table 3: CAIDA AS Core Graph 
AS Core Graph in 2000 AS Core Graph in 2018 
 
 
Source:  Center for applied Internet Data Analysis125 
 
Outlining the way traffic transits the system and infrastructure management contributes to 
understanding the implication of this topological complexity.  Internet traffic, that is the 
information represented as data packets, traverses various Autonomous Systems in order to get 
from a point of origin to a destination.  Historically, a hierarchical designation of various networks 
designated Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 helped distinguish among various typologies (defined through 
                                                          





scale and traffic volume) of managed interconnected networks.  The modern Internet is less 
hierarchical and not as easily classified by such nomenclature, but the designations persist to help 
understand Internet topology.  A common example of a Tier 1 Network is the vast interconnected 
physical and virtual infrastructure operated by L3 Communications.  L3 is a provider of backbone 
Internet services (among many other services) to other industry players, which include internet 
service providers (ISPs), who provide “last mile” connections to everyday users (i.e. companies 
such as Comcast, AT&T and others).  As data traverses the various networks within the Internet, 
formal and informal agreements allow for both “transit” and “peering” amongst various 
autonomous systems.  Transit is an agreement to allow data to cross one’s network providing both 
upstream and downstream routing to the networks connected to the entity network being transited.  
These agreements are often formal and are characterized as service level agreements (SLAs) that 
involve contracts to provide access to the larger Internet.  A second sort of arrangement is called 
“peering”.  Peering involves sharing traffic volume and downstream routing with a partner, and 
these arrangements are often traditionally informal in nature.  Peering involves hardware 
interconnection done at a physical location known as an Internet Exchange Point or IXP.  
According to a list maintained by Packet Clearing House (PCH) an international non-profit 
organization responsible for some aspects of IXP governance, there are at least 924 physical IXP 
locations, but those locations support more than a million individual peering agreements between 
entities.126  Traditionally, this is seen as a mutually beneficial relationship in that downstream 
routes (towards the endpoint/user) can be shared to the mutual benefit of both participants instead 
of paying for an upstream transit arrangement, thus reducing cost to IXP participants while 
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granting them access to larger downstream population.  Surveys find that these peering 
arrangements are remarkably resistant to formalization and instead rely on informal “handshake” 
agreements.  According to PCH, of 1,935,822 analyzed agreements in 2016 found .07% were 
formalized in written contracts.127  This represents a drop from the 0.49% found in a 2011 
survey.128  This means the 99.93% were informal handshake agreements that PCH characterized 
as “…in which the parties agreed to informal or commonly understood terms without creating a 
written document.”  The same survey report goes on to state:   
“These numerous informal agreements are arrived at by the “peering coordinators” 
or carrier-interconnection negotiation staff of the networks, often at self-organized 
regional or global “peering forums” that take place many times each year. Several 
of the respondents who participated in follow-up interviews noted that they 
expected the portion of written contracts to continue to decline over time because, 
in many cases, existing written contracts were expiring as their defined terms 
passed or their original signatories were subsumed, and although the relationships 
continued to grow on an informal basis, the written contracts related to them were 
not being renewed.”129 
 
This informality also breeds social connectivity among the individuals charged with making sure 
the IXPs function and connectivity is maintained.  That social strata instantiated though peering 
forums is but one way communities of practice arise.  Those types of connections will be further 
operationalized in the section below.  Two technical distinctions have been made above, 1) The 
Internet relies on a system of routing of data packets amongst many autonomous networks and 
subnetworks, and 2) this means there is pervasive interconnection in the form of transit and peering 
which is controlled through both formal and informal mechanisms.  The implications of this 
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interconnected system of operation are apparent each level of analysis when viewed through the 
ICIRS model.  The physical and logical layers of the Information Centered Security Model (which 
are both part of ICIRS) encompasses the resources and constituencies being discussed here.  The 
system of routing and the protocol stack across which the discussed interconnection of tier 1, 2, 
and 3 network providers operate can be thought of as having implications when coming into 
contact with individual, state, international, global, for-profit and non-profit levels of analysis.  As 
discussed above, the system of interconnection is governed by non-profit entities such as the IETF 
and ICANN that have been studied and detailed by other authors as they impact on each of those 
levels, however at a less abstract level, how are problems solved when something goes wrong in 
terms of everyday function?   
Answering that question means looking at the operational level of practice, at which other 
institutions have evolved as the Internet has grown.  The various network operators across the 
various tiers have evolved regional collectives known as Network Operations Groups (NOGs), 
several which exist across various regions.  Network engineers and practitioners can exchange 
information through these collectives.  The first of these collectives was the North American 
Network Operators Group (NANOG), which evolved from NSFNET “Regional-Techs” meetings.  
These meetings were a chance for technical staff from various regional networks that made up 
NSFNET to discuss operation issues of common concern eventually formalizing into NANOG.  
Meetings are held three times each year, and include presentations, tracks, and tutorials.  The 
meetings are informal, NANOG membership and meetings are open to all interested individuals. 
Conference participants typically include senior engineering staff from tier 1 and tier 2 ISPs.  
Participating researchers present short summaries of their work for operational feedback.  




place on the periphery of NOG meetings.130 These sorts of periphery meet-ups can be social in 
nature or centered on a specific topic or job function drawing a smaller subset of attendees from 
the larger NOG conferences.131  Matthews studies and details the establishment and activities of 
the North American NOG (NANOG) in his dissertation, his findings reinforce the assertions made 
here.  He asserts that the institution acts as an “anchor” that helps draw together individuals who 
form trust relationships, both with each other, with the institution, and with the involved 
technology thus instantiating a “community of practice”.132  In effect, individuals and entities 
participating in NANOG and similar collectives drawn from the ranks of companies and 
organizations managing and governing the Internet, are embedded within the logical layer of the 
ICIRS model.  As such, they possess a unique mix of agency and awareness that allows them to 
function both as a threat recognition and remediation agents.  In order to better understand how 
such communities of practice function, the following section will focus on the individual level as 
a means to show how the interconnected topology of the Internet has bred a community of practice 
that is able to recognize and remediate issues related to BGP routing.  It is necessary to keep in 
mind that parts of that same community overlap with a wide array of other security focused 
elements and communities of practice, parts of which were discussed in the case vignettes 
presented above in chapter three and will be discussed again later in this chapter. 
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4.1.1- BGP Routing Errors 
Threats born of malicious intent using malware, such as those previously detailed, are not 
the only vector of compromise on the Internet.  Structural realities of how the Internet functions 
can leave the system open to adverse consequences due to misconfiguration, errant data, or 
exploitation.  Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), introduced above, is a standard through which 
various autonomous networks can identify what servers belong to which disparate connected 
network.  For example, Google servers know which ones belong within their own network, and 
collectively, that network is identified and recognized by other networks that reciprocate this 
awareness.  This arrangement is necessarily transparent so that data is able to traverse the many 
collections of physical infrastructure, much of which is owned privately or held by universities 
and public entities and together make up the Internet.  The traversal of that data is known by the 
technical term “routing.” The reciprocal recognition of networks relies on simple trust.  We “trust” 
Google’s servers to identify themselves, just as we “trust” Netflix or the US Government to 
identify their own servers.  These lists of self-identified networks are then propagated across the 
Internet, shared so that any connected terminal is able to ask for and receive the data it requests. 
That data may cross many third-party owned or controlled networks in order to arrive at the 
requesting terminal.  This system of trust has not always functioned as envisioned.  Examples of 
the transnational effects of such BGP errors abound.  For example, in March 2015, an Indian 
broadband provider named Hathaway changed a technical prefix (the identifying marker of an 
individual network), accidently directing traffic meant for Google’s servers to their own network. 
According to a news article detailing the incident, “Hathaway’s BGP error was accepted by its 




accepted by other network providers including Cogent, Level 3, Orange, Singapore Telecom and 
Pakistan Telecom…”133 
Private network operators provide a significant portion of worldwide bandwidth, acting as 
a middle-man between service providers that provide access to the wider public, these providers 
(like Cogent, Level 3 and others) make up the Internet’s “back-bone”.  BGP errors manifest in the 
inaccessibility of affected servers, in this case the appearance of “Google” services being down.  
When BGP routing is utilized maliciously, an act known as “route hijacking”, which occurs when 
false mappings are propagated to intentionally reroute traffic to a third party.  These sorts of 
incidents, malicious or unintentional, occur with surprising frequency on the modern Internet.  
Recognizing, diagnosing, and subsequently fixing such occurrences take place on small time-
scales.  Usually, when a major network, i.e. Google, experiences a BGP-related error, the problem 
is solved in a matter of hours.  It is useful to briefly trace the manner in which such threat redress 
occurs.  The following testimonial appeared as a blog post on the website of the California based 
computer security firm, CloudFlare: 
“Today [6 Nov 2012], Google's services experienced a limited outage for about 27 
minutes over some portions of the Internet. The reason this happened dives into the 
deep, dark corners of networking”134. 
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The same individual goes on to explain the reason for the outage, and how he tracked the problem 
to an Indonesian ISP:  
“I looked at the BGP Routes for a Google IP Address. The route traversed Moratel 
(23947), an Indonesian ISP. Given that I'm looking at the routing from California 
and Google is operating Data Centre's not far from our office, packets should never 
be routed via Indonesia. The most likely cause was that Moratel was announcing a 
network that wasn't actually behind them”135. 
 
The US-based engineer was able to help effect a solution by contacting Moratel. He writes: 
“The solution was to get Moratel to stop announcing the routes they shouldn't be. 
A large part of being a network engineer, especially working at a large network like 
CloudFlare's, is having relationships with other network engineers around the 
world. When I figured out the problem, I contacted a colleague at Moratel to let 
him know what was going on. He was able to fix the problem at around 2:50 UTC 
6:50pm PST. Around 3 minutes later, routing returned to normal and Google's 
services came back online. Looking at peering maps, I'd estimate the outage 
impacted around 3–5% of the Internet's population. The heaviest impact will have 
been felt in Hong Kong, where PCCW is the incumbent provider. If you were in 
the area and unable to reach Google's services around that time, now you know 
why”.136 
The preceding anecdote demonstrates the process by which involved entities were able to 
coordinate and redress a certain subset of routing problems and helps operationalize one such 
community of practice being discussed within this dissertation.  The actors were able to coordinate 
across minor seams.  The collaboration presented is somewhat ephemeral and takes place on a 
small time-scale.  In this case, a third-party security firm noticed an outage of Google’s service. 
An individual within that third-party firm decided to diagnose the issue, and was able to enact a 
solution that affected 3-5% of the Internet’s total user population.  That solution involved a US-
based computer engineer leveraging a social connection with another individual located across the 
                                                          





world.  It is conceivable that “maintenance of relationships” referenced by the CloudFlare engineer 
references the types of relationships built and maintained at NOG meet-ups detailed earlier.  All 
this happened without the involvement of Google, the company whose system was most affected 
by the routing error.  According to the blog post, the problem was first observed around 6:24 PST 
in California and the solution was enacted in Indonesia at 6:50 PST.137 
This case illustrates the enabling effect of minor seams at the individual and for-profit levels 
of analysis.  The leveraging of a social connection between two engineers in separate private firms 
located in different countries remediated an issue that affected a large portion of the Internet’s user 
community, even though major seams existed between the parties effected and involved. In fact, 
Google, the company most effected by the error was not involved in the diagnosis and remediation 
of the problem. If Google had been involved, they would have necessarily had to contact Moratel 
but may not have benefited from the social connection and thus minor tie these two engineers had. 
In fact, one can assume that Google’s internal process may have led to a slower response due to 
an entrenched bureaucracy characterized by many seams.  The example helps operationalize the 
concept of a community of practice, as does the prior discussion of Morris Worm.  Admittedly, 
the contexts of those two discussions are very different.  However, the Morris Worm incident 
shows how the very structure of the early Internet begat a system of distributed agency brought to 
bear during crisis and problem solving, and the BGP routing case shows how continued evolution 
in scale and interconnectedness has bred entrenched and robust communities of practice centered 
on continued operation of the Internet while also having implications at various levels of analysis.  
There is significant overlap between the network engineering community of practice and the 





community surrounding security, and the next section will identify specific segments of that 
community and discuss various facets of identity and practice. 
4.2 The Operational Security Community of Practice and the “Takedown” 
The sections above sketched, in a broad sense, a community of practice that evolved around 
network engineering leveraging individuals and entities embedded within the logical layer of the 
ICIRS model and involved with the function and management of the Internet.  Similarly, there 
exists an operational security community of practice that does overlap substantially with the 
network engineering community of practice as the individuals are often employees of various 
companies and institutions that help manage the Internet’s network infrastructure.  This includes 
hardware, software, tier1, 2, and 3 network companies along with governance institutions such as 
ICANN and academics.  In addition, that community also draws on specialty industry experience 
such as individuals involved in banking, defense, law enforcement, and others who have deep ties 
to information technology and Internet security due to niche experience as consequence of job 
function as well as for profit and non-profit information security focused companies and 
institutions.   
The author attended a conference of the Internet Security and Operational Intelligence (ISOI) 
group, conducting the field work presented within this dissertation.  ISOI is an event to which all 
new attendees have to be “vouched” for by an existing ISOI member or members before being 
invited.  ISOI represents a “loose, grassroots collaboration of various security and Internet 
infrastructures stakeholders.”138  The conference is held at least once and sometimes twice a year, 
at times on the periphery of another security conference or event so as to maximize the ability of 
                                                          




members to attend.  This is a non-trivial issue as multiple ISOI attendees discussed the lack of 
institutionalized funding within their respective organizations to attend an event such as ISOI, this 
is despite of the utter centrality these same individuals placed on ISOI as an integral part of both 
their job and professional networking.  There were representatives from all the above referenced 
categories present at the event attended by this author.  The conference content is not published 
and all discussions at ISOI are held in general confidence (unless otherwise specified) amongst 
attendees in order to encourage openness and frank discussion amongst participants.  This author 
spoke with multiple attendees to gather information and understand the community and types of 
practices that enable individuals and institutions to participate in security provisioning and threat 
recognition inherent to the modern Internet and information technology space.  Individuals present 
at the conference represented a cohort containing one or multiple persons whom were active 
participants in most malware/take down operations covered within this dissertation spanning 2008 
to 2017.  Discussions with these individuals were mostly semi-structured or unstructured and all 
of them asked that specific attribution not be assigned due to operational security concerns.  
Thereby, specific insights generated are not attributed to individuals but are noted as derived from 
author interviews.   
The ISOI community makes use of multiple channels of communication in order to exchange 
information and collaborate.  In addition to the in-person conferences, members communicate via 
the online Ops-Trust portal (Ops-T).  Ops-Trust is a heavily peer vetted online forum that has been 
purpose built to facilitate secure collaboration amongst the operational security constituency.139  
Their mission is to promote “…responsible action against malicious behavior beyond just 
                                                          




observation, analysis, and research.”140  Ops-T enables collaboration using various models of trust 
chosen and administered by constituencies who govern themselves and utilize the Ops-T platform.  
Thereby, an account on Ops-T only allows you to participate within a group if that group 1) invites 
you, and 2) you are affirmed within the trust model that group has instantiated.  This could mean 
that at least one person already in the group has vouched for you and you have been approved by 
a group administrator or it could mean that all members of the group have to vouch for you before 
you are granted access to that group’s communications and materials.  Conceptually, member 
groups on Ops-T follow a structure that distinguishes between a “sphere of trust,” a “sphere of 
action” and a “need to know”.  The practice is fairly well institutionalized and translates the idea 
that information and interaction stays within “sphere of trust” which is vetted, that action is 
conducted amongst a group of trusted actors, and only those with a need can access relevant 
information. One of the most obvious indicators of practice observed across the Ops-T community 
both through interactions during ISOI and beyond within the more general information security 
community of practice, is usage of a highly institutionalized system of information classification.  
This system is referenced as traffic light protocol or “TLP.”   
TLP is system that marks information shared amongst community members as belonging to 
either a “white,” “green,” “amber,” or “red,” category.  Tracing the history of TLP is difficult as 
various individuals interviewed gave divergent accounts of when it was introduced, however it 
appears that individuals within various NOG communities developed and institutionalized it within 
the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) organization.141  According to 
FIRST materials, the protocol has its roots in the United Kingdom amongst public and private 
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sector security professionals.  Various ISACs, CERTs, and other important communities further 
adopted the protocols.  Even US-CERT within DHS has adopted TLP and publishes guides on 
their website detailing definitions of the various categories that they derive from FIRST.  The 
FIRST guide provided to the public contains some insight into the inherited nature of language 
and the way in which the community builds upon prior work.  The version 1.0 document has a 
footnote which reads “This document uses ‘should’ and ‘must’ as defined by RFC-2119.”142  The 
term RFC references IETF “Requests for Comment,” which are memos that document technical 
and organizational notes about the Internet that help codify various technical standards and norms 
while also providing a vector of institutional knowledge retention.  RFC-2119 published in March 
1997 concerned “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels.”143  The RFC 
codifies when and how to use the terms “MUST,” “MUST NOT,” “SHOULD,” “SHOULD NOT,” 
“MAY.”  It also specifies how to use those terms with regarding “security consideration”:   
“These terms are frequently used to specify behavior with security implications.  
The effects on security of not implementing a MUST or SHOULD, or doing 
something the specification says MUST NOT or SHOULD NOT be done may be 
very subtle. Document authors should take the time to elaborate the security 
implications of not following recommendations or requirements as most 
implementors will not have had the benefit of the experience and discussion that 
produced the specification.”144 
That language is used subsequently when defining the TLP system.  FIRST specifies: 
• “TLP RED - Not for disclosure, restricted to participants only. Sources may 
use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by 
additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, 
or operations if misused. Recipients may not share TLP:RED information 
with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation 
in which it was originally disclosed. In the context of a meeting, for 
                                                          
142 FIRST “Traffic Light Protocol (TLP).” https://first.org/tlp 
143 Bradner, Scott. “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels.” Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). 1997. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119 




example, TLP:RED information is limited to those present at the meeting. 
In most circumstances, TLP:RED should be exchanged verbally or in 
person. 
• “TLP AMBER - Limited disclosure, restricted to participants’ 
organizations. Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires 
support to be effectively acted upon, yet carries risks to privacy, reputation, 
or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved. Recipients 
may only share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own 
organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the 
information to protect themselves or prevent further harm. Sources are at 
liberty to specify additional intended limits of the sharing: these must be 
adhered to. 
• “TLP GREEN - Limited disclosure, restricted to the community.  Sources 
may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all 
participating organizations as well as with peers within the broader 
community or sector. Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with 
peers and partner organizations within their sector or community, but not 
via publicly accessible channels. Information in this category can be 
circulated widely within a particular community. TLP:GREEN information 
may not released outside of the community. 
• “TLP WHITE - Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE 
when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in 
accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject 
to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed 
without restriction.”145 
 
TLP is now firmly ensconced among security professionals, and interestingly, the community 
has even established various sanctions for individuals that violate TLP.  These vary depending on 
the severity of the disclosure, ranging from admonishment to full excommunication.  One 
professional interviewed for this dissertation expressed excitement for the manner in which that 
sanctioning has changed, commenting that “…it used be that the community was too small and if 
someone violated TLP you had to balance the necessity of their presence within the community 
with the fact they leaked.  However, now that the community is bigger, we have multiple resources 
and individuals who can step up”146  Several individuals interviewed at ISOI expressed the 
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importance of TLP and discussed considerations when conveying information and collaboration.  
They spoke of various cases in which TLP was violated and the community took action to sanction 
guilty parties.   
While TLP has been informally used for, at least, the past decade and a half, it wasn’t until 
2016 that a FIRST special interest group produced a common, standardized set of definitions for 
all TLP colors.147  The manner that TLP has been adopted and relied upon within the community 
is a powerful indication of practice and community made obvious in no small part by the 
seriousness with which individuals adhere to the classification scheme.  Emails and printed 
information passed among community members are designated with the “…TLP color of 
information in the subject line and in the body of the email, prior to the designated information 
itself.  TLP color must be in capital letters…”148  The fact that the system can lead to sanctions 
despite the lack of any formal legal mechanism underlying the system makes apparent the 
institutionalized culture present within the security community of practice.   
The community of practice surrounding information security manifests that culture as shared 
concept of identity, and TLP along with the cultural norms surrounding its usage helps indicate 
and define it.  TLP shows how the initial debates which took place on Phage during the Morris 
Worm that questioned who should be included and have access to the mailing list have evolved 
into the present.  Those questions led to the creation of tools and mechanisms such as TLP.  One 
of the reasons such a system is necessary is due the active operations the community of practice 
engages in.  The next section will discuss the practice of a “takedown”. 
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4.2.1 The “Takedown” 
  ISOI is but one trust group utilizing Ops-Trust.  The site allows for mixed media collaboration 
and information sharing.  It is an example of the multiple collaborative mechanisms that have 
sprung up around Internet security since the days of the Morris Worm.  What once was just mailing 
lists has evolved into incorporated non-profits with purpose-built information infrastructures, 
conferences, public and private partnerships, social networking and communication mechanisms, 
and much more.  These range from highly vetted platforms like Ops-Trust to easily accessed 
mailing lists, to large scale corporately backed Information Security Analysis Centers (ISACs) 
which often exist as both private partnerships and as private/public partnerships across various 
industry sectors and geographic groupings.   
In the US, the National Council of ISACS serves as an umbrella organization of 24 
“organizations designated by their sectors as their information sharing and operational arms.”149  
ISACS were introduced through Presidential Decision Directive-63 (PDD-63) in May of 1998 and 
began forming around individual critical infrastructures in 1999.  The organizations exist to foster 
public/private information sharing and many have 24/7 warning and incident reporting 
capabilities.150  The Nation Council describes its role as follows:   
“The NCI is a true cross-sector partnership, providing a forum for sharing cyber and 
physical threats and mitigation strategies among ISACs and with government and 
private sector partners during both steady-state conditions and incidents requiring 
cross-sector response. Sharing and coordination is accomplished through daily and 
weekly calls between ISAC operations centers, daily reports, requests-for-information, 
                                                          






monthly meetings, exercises, and other activities as situations require. The NCI also 
organizes its own drills and exercises and participates in national exercises.”151 
 
The ISAC concept has spread to other regions of the world, for example in Europe the European 
Union Agency for Network and Information Security advocates for the establishment of European 
and National level ISACs and has published various reports detailing cooperative models being 
used along with incentives and  barriers to information sharing within the European ISAC 
context.152  In addition to ISACs which operate as an interface between private critical 
infrastructure providers and national governments, the concepts of CERTS was alluded to above 
as an outcome of the Morris Worm incident. 
CERTS act as another information sharing and central location on which countries and 
industries can turn to for information security expertise.  In the US case, the original DARPA 
funded CERT at Carnegie Mellon was incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security as 
US-CERT and now publicizes cyber threats both to the technical community and public.  However, 
all these organizations, ISACS, CERTS, and other information sharing infrastructures differ, 
conceptually, from the operational community represented by Ops-Trust and other organizing 
mailing lists, forums and communities.  Perhaps the most obvious indicator of practice related to 
that community has become a persistent march of botnet takedowns which have continued from 
the time of Conficker to the present.  The “takedown” is a term that is shorthand for an operation 
aimed at stopping malicious activities due to malware often associated with botnets or other 
widespread threats.  Over time, takedowns have evolved into legitimate legal maneuvers including 
                                                          





law enforcement and judicial constituencies but there have been historic examples which may have 
been within legal “gray space.” 
Academic literature that arose in the wake of the Conficker incident served as early indications 
of practice that institutionalized the terminology of takedowns.  Examples of early papers include 
the 2012 workshop presentation by Dave Dittrich entitled “So You Want to Take Over a Botnet.” 
The author begins by defining basic terminology like “bot” and “botnet” before defining various 
levels of response ranging from observation to takedown and eradication.  He defines the 
“takedown” as identifying weaknesses in the C&C structures…” that “…can completely disrupt 
any new infections, any connections with the C&C infrastructure, and any means of the attacker 
countering your actions.”153  Dittrich notes when discussing the takedown of the Storm botnet that 
remediation efforts which demonstrated one could remotely clean up some infected computers 
without interaction from those system owners fell into realm of “…some well-reasoned ethical 
debate.”154   
Dittrich briefly outlines some examples of takedowns which include the Totpig, Mega-D, 
Conficker, Waledac and Mariposa botnets.  The Mariposa botnet will be further explored in the 
next section.  Before doing so, it is important to note the myriad tools and organizations that have 
sprung up around the idea of operational security, information sharing, and security provisioning.  
As detailed above, portals such as Ops-Trust and others should be considered strong indicators of 
practice helping to show how the community of practice is engaging in collaborative discussion 
and problem solving.  Mechanisms such as TLP also help illustrate an institutionalized culture 
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unique to the community which has evolved since the time of the Morris Worm.  Specific non-
profit entities have been setup to facilitate take-down activities as well.  Once such organization is 
the Shadowserver Foundation.   
Founded in 2004, the Shadowserver Foundation is a non-profit entity which helps facilitate 
“sink-hole” operations.  A “sink-hole” is the term of art for the act of redirecting illicit traffic away 
from the intended C&C infrastructure which is emanating from infected computers within a botnet 
to a third-party server controlled by “the good guys.”  Part of Shadowserver’s utility is that the 
foundation helps provide server space for such operations, this can cost money and as detailed in 
several of the cases above, can be the cause of failure or limited success.  Volunteers help run 
Shadowserver, one such individual interviewed commented that while it was a role he filled due 
to his interest, his Shadowserver activities often take up more time than his “day job.” 155  
Shadowserver also lists the following goals on their website: 
• “Investigate and contribute to new technologies in botnet control. 
• “Develop and deploy new methods for harvesting malware and studying its behavior. 
• “Develop and utilize additional techniques for gathering and analyzing botnet data and 
network flows. 
• “Work more closely with ISPs, Hosting and DNS providers in the identification and 
mitigation of botnets and malware propagation. 
• “Increase our collaboration with other key security organizations and researchers to share 
discoveries and analysis. 
• “Develop and release whitepapers and reports based on our research. 
• “Further develop our website to provide information and reports to the interested public. 
• “Participate in future security conferences and workgroups. 
• “Increase our communication with the public through irc, mailing lists, and the website”156 
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It should be noted, that while Shadowserver’s website appears to not have been updated in 
quite some time, the organization is still very much active as indicated by discussions with 
participants and representatives during various conferences and workshops attended by this 
author.  For example, Shadowserver participated in in the takedown of the Avalanche “fast 
flux” malware, during which sink-holing operations showed at least two million unique 
victim IP address from the world in just over a 48-hour period.  Avalanche will be discussed 
further later in this chapter; the next section will explore the Mariposa Botnet to help 
understand the diverse set of actors and constituencies within the modern provisioning 
environment. 
 
4.3 The Mariposa Botnet  
Whereas Conficker represented an incident in which the perpetrators were never found, the 
Mariposa Botnet followed closely on the heels of that event and represents a more complete case 
study in that it involved a law enforcement investigatory phase and a prosecutorial phase that 
unfolded across international borders and involved several elements.  It is used here as an 
introduction to the modern security community of practice that crosses many constituencies and 
highlights a more mature infrastructure than that of Conficker, though it hails from the same time 
period.  It also represents the now common practice called a “takedown” that has evolved as a 
partnership across private and public constituencies to help identify emerging threats and threat 
actors, and then undertake actions to mitigate, investigate and prosecute those actors.  In fact, 




discussing the Mariposa case, data gathered across a number of takedown/remediation events will 
be presented before drawing conclusions guided by the ICIRS model in chapter five.  
In 2009, a Canadian information security company, Defence Intelligence, observed a piece of 
software being propagated that permitted a degree of remotely administered control over a wide 
range of computers. They named this network of compromised computers the “Mariposa botnet.”  
The Mariposa botnet infected more than “half of Fortune 1000 companies and more than 40 major 
banks.” The botnet was associated with over 11 million IP addresses between 23 December 2009 
and 9 February 2010.157  What transpired was a multi-national effort to eradicate the botnet, 
eventually leading to the arrest and prosecution of individuals in Slovenia and Spain.  Tracing the 
evolution of the botnet’s discovery, the building of a constituency to address the botnet, and the 
linkages within and outside of the information security space which led to arrests, prosecutions 
and mitigation provides insight into how diverse information security provisioning communities 
connect and function, while also highlighting several organizational seams. 
 Defence Intelligence was not the first company to observe the coordinated command and 
control of Mariposa through Domain Name System (DNS) activity. The coordinated 
communication of globally dispersed computers to centralized servers that did not seem to have 
legitimate functions was noticed by several organizations.158  The original C2 servers coordinating 
Mariposa were housed in Israel and Germany and activity was noticed by another security firm, 
Prevx.159  
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The Mariposa botnet seemed to be based upon a set of pre-packaged malware tools known 
as the “Butterfly Exploit Kit.” The kit was available for between 400 and 700 euros on known 
websites being sold as a “security” tool.160  In order to address the problem, Defence Intelligence, 
a relatively small company, forged a diverse set of partnerships. In a paper published by the 
company, they note there were few law enforcement institutions within their native Canada to 
which they were able to turn for help.161  They rejected a formal arrangement with the 
Technological Crime Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), concluding that it 
was hostile to free information exchange. Instead, they forged a relationship with information 
security professionals at the Georgia Tech Research Institute and Panda Security, an information 
security focused firm based in Spain.  When individuals associated with the effort were asked why 
they chose those partnerships, they answered that the team reflected professional connections built, 
in large part, through previous employment at a prior company in which a core group of 
participants were all coworkers.162  The three entities branded their collaboration the “Mariposa 
Working Group.” The working group tracked Mariposa activity in Latin America, South Korea, 
Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. Using technical means, they identified where the 
botnet was being administered, narrowing the location to Spain. Spanish authorities were contacted 
and the Spanish judicial system was leveraged to provide internet service provider records. This 
led to the arrest of a Spanish citizen and the identification of several individuals involved in the 
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botnet’s administration. In addition, the creator of the Butterfly Malware Kit was arrested in 
Slovenia.163  
 The Mariposa case provides a detailed example of the networked structure of modern 
information security provisioning and the resulting organizational seams. A small Canadian firm 
sought to address widespread infection of malware across private and public computer networks 
dispersed globally. Perceived weakness within the Canadian information security response 
infrastructure led the firm to partner with a US educational/research entity and another private 
Spanish firm.  The established “working group” captured and redirected internet traffic in order to 
investigate an identified threat.  Upon completing its research, the response then drew upon law 
enforcement and judicial infrastructure in Spain, Slovenia, the United States and several other 
countries.  The nature of that collaboration is revealing.  The individuals arrested in Spain and 
Slovenia were also indicted in the United States and the indictments provide a lens into the nature 
of trans-national legal collaboration within and around the information security space.   
 According to the indictment United States of American v. Matzaz Skorjanc, Florencio 
Carro Ruiz, and Mentor Leniqi, the individuals involved engaged in violations of US law regarding 
racketeering, conspiracy to commit fraud, and conspiracy to commit computer crimes.164  
According to the indictment, the FBI conducted an investigation that benefited from collaboration 
with at least one informant (unnamed) and collaboration with Spanish and Slovenian law 
enforcement.  This included sharing information obtained during searches by those entities.  For 
example, “Chat logs obtained during the search of RUIZ’s residence, and analyzed by the Spanish 
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Guardia Civil, demonstrate that RUIZ and Ostiator intentionally executed a DDOS attack against 
several websites at the request of Torbe.”165  Spanish authorities were able to zero in on the 
perpetrators due to information obtained by the Mariposa Working Group, one of the criminals 
“made a mistake” and tried to connect to a C&C server without anonymizing themselves.  This 
information was turned over to Spanish investigators who were able to trace the individual’s 
identity.166  The indictment also makes use of information obtained by Slovenian authorities 
specifically, “The digital evidence seized by the Slovenian National Police also contained saved 
online chat logs.”167  Information in such evidence was used to establish the charges against the 
defendants.  
 When viewed through the lens of organizational seams, the Mariposa example has several 
minor and major seams.  In this case, coordination occurred across the minor seams and the major 
seams actually constrained collaboration.  For example, the decision by Defence Intelligence to 
reject collaboration with the RCMP shows how the existence of a major seam between a 
government agency and a private firm structures choice in that it constrained their willingness to 
coordinate.  Rather, Defence Intelligence coordinated trans-nationally which paradoxically 
represents a minor seam consisting of information security professionals exploiting their social 
connections enabling an ad hoc yet effective working group that provided a public good ultimately 
leading to remediation and prosecution.  The Mariposa case is also useful because it goes beyond 
the Conficker example to show how law enforcement and judicial elements have become equally 
important within the remediation effort with regard to large scale Internet based threats.  The 
strategy that has emerged within both the operational security community of practice and the larger 
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law enforcement community is an agreement that to stop these large-scale threats, the people 
behind them must be pursued and punished.  Just such a strategy has been pursued by Microsoft 
which will be explored next. 
4.4 Microsoft Botnet Takedowns 
The history and chronology presented thus far has illustrated the ever widening and ever more 
complex emergence of cybersecurity concerns over the history of the Internet’s evolution.  
Controlling the spread and effect of botnets, particularly, has become a central security issue for 
various private entities that have business interests dependent on the Internet’s continued function 
and ease of access for the public.  This has led to a strategy that closely links such private entities 
to public legal and law enforcement resources.  Microsoft has pioneered pursuing civil action to 
“thwart and disable botnets”168.  One of the first of these actions was the takedown of the Waledac 
Botnet in 2010.  
Waledac was a network of infected computers that were sold as a service to third parties who 
utilized the network to send out spam email and execute criminal activities.169  Waledac used 277 
unique addresses to execute command and control over several “tiers” of infrastructure, the lowest 
being the infected computers that sent out actual spam and the upper tiers being a complex C&C 
system of repeaters.  From a technical point of view, this tiered system meant past remediation 
practices would be difficult to accomplish.  
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As such the strategy Microsoft designed was to pursue ex parte civil action directly suing “John 
Doe” defendants while asking for preliminary injunction which required VeriSign, a domain 
register, to lock the domains while the ownership was verified.  They pursued this action based 
not only on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the more recent CAN-SPAM Act, but via 
trademark litigation.  Microsoft employed the Lanham Act arguing the usage of Microsoft systems 
(Hotmail) and products to carry out the spam campaigns diluted their brand.170  The Microsoft 
strategy built upon a nascent legal understanding emerging within the US Justice system and it 
leveraged the Chinese Justice system as well in order to block various IP addresses.  Over the next 
several years, Microsoft executed a number of these take-down operations:  Rustock, Kelihos, 
Zeus, Nitol, and Bamitol along with two subsequent operations, the Citadel and the ZeroAccess 
botnets collaboratively with the FBI.171  Before discussing the last two it is useful to understand 
the Rustock takedown from a community of practice point of view. 
4.4.1 Rustock 
In 2011 the Rustock botnet was responsible for sending an incredible amount of spam 
email, some 30 billion emails a day, and at various times in its operational life the network was 
responsible for over 50% of worldwide spam.172  Versions of the malware had been present since 
2005 or 2006 and the botnet propagated and established itself by staying dormant for five days 
after infection making it harder to notice or track.  Estimates of the botnet’s size range from 
                                                          
170 Ibid., pp178-180 
171 Ibid., p. 186 





850,000 to more than a two million infected computers.173  On 16 March 2011 a coordinated effort 
between Microsoft, the US Marshall Service, FireEye, multiple state law enforcement, and several 
other entities executed Operation b107 aimed at taking the Rustock botnet offline.  The legal 
standing for seizing Rustock’s command and control servers and associated domains emanated 
from trademark infringement claims brought by Microsoft and Pfizer based on spam advertising 
of fake Viagra, a trademarked drug owned by Pfizer.  Washington University and the Dutch High-
Tech Crime Unit along with Chinese law enforcement all assisted in seizing equipment and 
blocking domains.174   
From a community of practice point of view, insights can be generated from a presentation 
given by Julia Wolf and Alex Lanstein at the Blackhat Security Conference in 2011.  The duo 
spoke regarding their involvement with the effort.  The talk was typical of such presentations which 
happen at many different conferences and workshops helping maintain information awareness 
amongst the community of practice.  It is interesting to observe, they hold the Rustock takedown 
in contrast to a takedown which didn’t work well, the Grum botnet.  They pointed out, their effort 
to take down Grum failed due to the way the offense and defense evolve.  An uncoordinated effort 
on the part of an individual at FireEye who attempted to stop the C&C infrastructure of Grum by 
imploring the upstream bandwidth provider for the malware’s server provider (this is to say, the 
ISP’s ISP so to speak) to block the C&C infrastructure.175  This forced the Grum botnet controllers 
to adapt their methods and become far more sophisticated.  This is an important point, not because 
of the technical nuances, but due to the inherent mistake being one of insufficient social connection 
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to leverage resources across multiple communities…not just tier 2 and 3 ISPs, but also that of law 
enforcement, software providers, and security community elements allowing the adversary to 
regroup and evolve their strategy.  Rustock, however, is presented as an example coordination with 
those constituencies to better perform a more successful takedown.  The effort started when 
Microsoft went to FireEye and asked them for a recommendation on what malware that, if taken 
down, would provide the greatest benefit to their customers.  Individuals within FireEye 
recommended the Rustock botnet.  Microsoft, at this time, had a specific unit set up within the 
company whose mandate was to “bring the hurt” to the bad guys.  Rustock was chosen because it 
was causing an “easily measurable harm.”176  The presentation further points out, targets which 
are not easily measurable are not as desirable as potential takedowns.  FireEye was engaged to 
provide an independent view apart from Microsoft’s during the takedown activities.  Microsoft 
asked FireEye to file a legal “declaration of harm” against the Rustock botnet controllers 
(individuals that promulgated and controlled the botnet).  However according to the FireEye 
employees, when the declaration was presented to a US Judge, the judge was confused and unsure 
of how to proceed or what was being asked of the court.  The judge asked to be given a few weeks 
to re-read the declaration in order to understand, amongst other things, the relationship between 
the malicious actors and the third party servers from which they were operating.177   
This shows the complex nature of modern malware, in that often nefarious actors rent 
server space from legitimate vendors, thereby takedown operations must involve the seizing of 
and redirecting of data from physical hardware that is not owned by the bad actors directly, but 
may also host legitimate enterprises.178  Relationships amongst the security community and various 
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functional entities such as DNS providers is pointed out as being extremely beneficial.  Lanstein 
says that by being friends with the DNS providers, they can provide technical information simply 
because “we asked” which is helpful.179   
Microsoft’s legal counsel was able to devise a new way to help show standing in US courts 
by employing provisions of the Lanham Act (parts not utilized in the earlier Waledac case) that 
allow a trademark holder to seize counterfeit goods that infringe upon their trademarks.  By 
showing brand damage from spam marketing counterfeit drugs, companies like Pfizer, Microsoft 
and their partners successfully argued to sinkhole Internet traffic.  Microsoft was also able to argue 
that the increased traffic brought about by spam had real world costs associated with the increased 
bandwidth they would have to support through their Hotmail email service, which was a major 
recipient of spam email.  Temporary access was granted by both US courts and Dutch courts 
allowing Microsoft and their lawyers to access servers located in both countries in order to gain 
forensic evidence.180  Contrasted against the experience of Grum, the Rustock botnet case was far 
more successful due to the multipronged approach, which stitched together Microsoft acting for 
the benefit of its brand and business interest, entities like FireEye that represented the now mature 
and professionalized security community, and judicial elements both in the US and abroad.  Hiller 
surmises the importance of the Rustock takedown from a legal standpoint:   
“…the Rustock case added legal specificity for court authority to order third parties 
to [do] botnet takedowns by purging IP addresses and domain names from the 
Internet, and preserving evidence.  Furthermore, it established the Lanham Act as 
a viable vehicle for Microsoft to seize physical botnet property and increased the 
ability of Microsoft to pursue the eradication of botnets through the civil system.”181 
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From the perspective of IR and Security studies, this represents a unique deputation of a private 
entity on behalf of the State acting in the interests of Internet users worldwide.  The Rustock 
takedown is a useful milepost in the steady march of provisioning activities beginning at Morris 
Worm and evolving through Conficker before becoming institutionalized practice.   
4.4.2 Evolving Microsoft Strategy 
Subsequently, Microsoft began to execute takedown operations with a fair regularity.  Later 
in 2011 they sued a limited liability company in the Czech Republic to cripple the Kelihos botnet.  
This was an interesting tactic as both defendants were outside of the US, but Microsoft was able 
to show standing in Virginia due to businesses being affected within that state.182  Microsoft further 
evolved their legal strategy in 2012 with the takedown of the Zeus malware.  Microsoft utilized 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).  The Zeus malware enabled this 
approach, as the malware stole banking credentials in furtherance of financial crime.  By showing 
that the criminal enterprise was an interstate and international operation, which implicitly due the 
nature of the Internet it was, Microsoft successfully argued the defendant’s actions were in 
furtherance of a criminal enterprise to move money across state and international lines.183  Above, 
it was pointed out that during the Rustock takedown, a judge had displayed a relative lack of 
knowledge and comfort with the subject matter and implications of what was being presented to 
the court.  However, during the Zeus takedown, the US government was closely involved, at an 
earlier stage and was a far more central instantiating actor.  US courts issued findings and 
judgments, and the US Marshall Service was instrumental in seizing physical computing hardware 
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in wider fashion than during previous takedowns.  The Financial Service ISAC (FS-ISAC) joined 
Microsoft as a plaintiff in the case.184   
It should be noted, the Kelihos take down was not entirely successful, which will be 
discussed in the next section below.  These are all clear indicators that seams between public and 
private constituencies across the “cyber patchwork” were transitioning from major to minor as the 
practice of botnet takedowns had finally become routinized across many different collaborating 
entities including the law enforcement community.  The next section will identify numerous 
security provisioning cases and consider them in aggregate alongside the reviewed provisioning 
activities in prior sections and chapters to generate observations and insights.  
4.5 Take-down operations in Summary 
 So far this chapter has reviewed a number of various security provisioning activities 
summarizing some while robustly analyzing others.  Table 4 below identifies distinct takedowns 
and security provisioning activities, representing varying degrees of collaboration amongst 
participants across the “cyber patchwork.”  The dates indicate when the botnet/malware was first 
observed and the second date indicates when either there was an attempt to takedown the botnet 
or the last year that related law enforcement or other activity occurred.  These could include 
judicial activity like indictments or sentencing.  It includes many of the cases detailed in previous 
sections and chapters along with several other cases.  The intent of the table isn’t to provide a 
detailed accounting of specifics related any one of the identified cases, but to present the fact such 
activities have occurred regularly over the past twelve years into the present.  Each of the entries 
on the table represents a collection of primary, secondary, and tertiary material gathered in support 
                                                          




of this dissertation.  That material isn’t presented exhaustively as both the specificity and quality 
of data collected varied greatly across all cases.  However, a number of dynamics can be identified 
and will be discussed next.   
Table 4:  Summary of Takedown/Security Provisioning Activities 
Botnet/Malware Year Discovered Takedown/Activity Short Description 
Zotob 2005 2006 Worm which took down CNN and other 
corporations worldwide.  Moroccan virus writer 
sentenced in Morocco in 2006185 
Conficker 2008 2008 Botnet often presented as a canonical case study in 
networked security provisioning based on the 
activities of the Conficker Working Group186 
McColo Srizbi 2007 2008 Takedown of large spam hosting service provider 
through private action of upstream providers. 
McColo servers hosted the Srizbi botnet, third party 
legitimate operations were also affected187 
Storm 2007 2008 Large botnet that used a number of defensive 
techniques and one of the many which became 
commodity rented as a capability for criminal 
activity.  The botnet was also notable as it became a 
“battleground” over which various factions fought 
for control.  A team of German researchers 
attempted to disrupt the botnet’s activities though a 
technique called “poisoning” which has ethical 
implications due to the act of changing/modifying 
information on victims’ computers without explicit 
permission188 
Mariposa 2008 2009 Botnet dismantled by the Mariposa Working Group 
led by Canadian firm Defence Intelligence.  The 
effort was similar to the Conficker experience, even 
resulting in the identification, arrest, and 
prosecution of individuals behind the botnet in 
Spain and Slovenia.189 
Mega-D 2008 2009 An operation in 2008 by both the US FTC and FBI 
along with agencies in New Zealand froze the 
financial assets of the operators of the Mega-D 
botnet, this preceded a FireEye takedown operation 
in 2009 which redirected C2 infrastructure in 
collaboration with the upstream ISP of the botnet190 
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Table 4 Continued 
Botnet/Malware Year Discovered Takedown/Activity Short Description 
Cutwail 2007 2010 Takedown involving UC Santa Barbara and Ruhr 
University Bochum191 
Waledac 2008 2010 One of the first of many Microsoft takedown 
operations. Microsoft was granted “ownership” of 277 
domains that Waledac used in operation.192 
Lethic 2008 2010 The company Neustar attempted a takedown of the 
Lethic botnet in 2010 though later that year the 
botnet’s originators (allegedly) were able to regain 
control of parts of the network. Neustar was able to 
convince the botnet’s ISP to redirect the C2 
infrastructure which led to large and measurable 
decline in internet wide spam 
DNSChanger 2006 2011 The DNS Changer Working Group (DCWG) created 
to help remediate via “Operation Ghost Click” 
included the FBI. An Estonian national was charged 
for its distribution193 
Rustock 2006 2011 Botnet addressed as part of Microsoft campaign 
employed provisions of the Lanham act helping 
establish trademark-based seizing of physical servers 
for forensics194 
Coreflood 2010 2011 In a 2011 operation, the FBI requested and was given 
permission by US Courts to delete Coreflood malware 
on infected computer if provided written consent from 
users of those computers.195 
Nitol 2012 2012 Nitol was another takedown operation by Microsoft 
that led to unattended consequences.  The dynamic 
DNS operator 3322.org was taken over by Microsoft in 
an effort to address the Nitol botnet which was using 
the service, Pen Yon 3322.org’s owner later settled 
with Microsoft over damages he claimed.196 
Bredolab 2009 2012 Bredolab was dismantled by Dutch law enforcement 
and led to the arrest of an Armenian national who was 
sentenced in four years in jail in 2012197 
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Table 4 Continued 
Botnet/Malware Year Discovered Takedown/Activity Short Description 
Grum 2009 2012 Partial success was found by FireEye in an operation 
to disable the Grum botnet, contact with the upstream 
ISP was not enough to disable the botnet due to a 
evolving sophistication of those who controlled it 
responding to FireEye’s efforts. 198 
Citadel 2012 2013 Citadel is often thought of a derivative of the Zeus 
(original variant not the one referenced below) 
malware, its creator was a Russian National that was 
extradited from Norway to the US and prosecuted. 
Bamital 2009 2013 Joint operation between Microsoft and Symantec 
(antivirus and security company).  This temporarily 
broke some infected computers’ ability to use some 
web search services. Technicians associated with the 
two companies “raided data centers” accompanied by 
US Marshals to pull servers offline. Bamital enabled 
“click fraud” in which search results were fraudulently 
manipulated to garner advertising income. 
ZeroAccess 2011 2013 An operation led by Microsoft to dismantle the 
ZeroAccess botnet was seen, by some, as a failure due 
to the fact not all of the C&C infrastructure was taken 
offline 
Simda 2010 2015 Microsoft partnered with INTERPOL, Kaspersky Lab, 
Trend Micro and Japan’s Cyber Defense Institute to 
effect the Simda takedown.  The operation also 
involved Dutch agencies, the FBI and law enforcement 
in Luxembourg and Russia199 
Shylock 2011 2014 The European Cybercrime Centere (EC3) led a 
multinational effort with collaboration from the UK 
National Crime Agency, the FBI, the Netherlands, 
Turkey, Italy, Germany, Poland, and France. Shylock 
was named after pieces of its code that contained 
excerpts of Shakespeare. Shylock was also banking 
malware that steals credentials for financial fraud and 
abuse. 
GameOver Zeus 2011 2014 GameOver Zeus was banking malware that stole 
credentials, the takedown was named “Operation 
Tovar” and involved the FBI, Europol, and the UK’s 
National Crime Agency. In addition to these public 
entities, private firms were involved including: 
CrowdStrike, Dell SecureWorks, Symantec, Trend 
Micro and McAfee. Both the VU University 
Amsterdam and Saarland University in Germany were 
involved as well. The FBI also placed the malware’s 
operator, Evgeniy Mikhalovich Bogachev on its “Most 
Wanted” list.200 
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Table 4 Continued 
Botnet/Malware Year Discovered Takedown/Activity Short Description 
Blackshades 2012 2014 The FBI began operations in 2012 to arrests 24 hackers 
in eight countries and various operations carried on 
until 2014 when the FBI coordinated a worldwide 
effort which led to the arrest of nearly one hundred 
people in nineteen countries that were using 
Blackshades for cyber-crime.  The software was 
available for sale through various “dark web” 
portals.201 
Ramnit 2010 2015 Ramnit was dismantled by Europol and involved 
partner in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK 
along with Microsoft and Symantec 
Dorkbot 2012 2015 Dorkbot was unique in that it spread through instant 
messaging and social networks by enticing victims to 
download a malicious zip file.  The malware was 
subject to a takedown collaboration by Microsoft, 
ESET, Poland’s CERT, the FBI, DHS, INTERPOL, 
the RCMP, and the Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).  Microsoft 
reportedly provided “telemetry” to law enforcement 
agencies around the world to assist in the effort. Newer 
versions of Dorkbot are reported to have resurfaced in 
2018 used to steal banking credentials.202 
Kelihos 2010 2017 Kelihos represents a number of takedown attempts 
stretching from 2012 to 2017 of various variants.  The 
operators of Kelihos were allegedly behind Waledac as 
well203 
Avalanche 2009 2017 Shadowserver along with European and International 
law enforcement executed this takedown operation.  
The Avalanche malware made use of a “fast-flux” 
hosting method that helped it defend against being 
dismantled.  The operation was hailed as a new 
template for collaborative security involving private 
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Table 4 Continued 
Botnet/Malware Year Discovered Takedown/Activity Short Description 
Dridex 2014 2016 Dridex was another botnet that specialized in 
harvesting banking credentials for engaging in 
financial crime. In 2016 the UK National Crime 
Agency working with the FBI arrested 14 individuals 
accused of using Dridex and variants to steal money.205 
Mirai 2016 2018 While Mirai was never subject to a “takedown” 
operation, the FBI did trace and question two 
individuals that ended up confessing to its creation, 
they avoided jail time by agreeing to robust 
cooperation with the government on cybercrime 
investigations. The botnet is considered the first 
“internet of things” malware and can be utilized for 
massive DDOS campaigns enabled though poorly 
secured Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as 
cameras, DVRs and other internet aware technology. 
Mirai also demonstrates that when ‘new’ threats 
emerge, individuals within the information security 
community embedded within the functional structure 
of the Internet are the first to become aware of the 
threat and begin problem solving. 206 
 
 When analyzing the breadth of data, it becomes apparent that simple observation of the 
emergence of a hitherto unseen botnet or piece of malware does not necessarily lead to an 
organized takedown with any immediacy.  Often months to years can pass before an attempt is 
made by elements of the community of practice to take action and address a threat.  As observed 
during the discussion of the Rustock botnet, this may be because certain targets are more desirable 
than others in terms of observable metrics and impact.  Also, often elements of the community are 
engaging in information exchange, discussions, observations, and coordination to understand and 
decide if a threat should be addressed.  In the case of Kehilos, the time gap on the table represents 
a series of failed take down events across successive versions of the malware in 2012 and again in 
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2013.  Finally, in 2017 a joint operation between Shadowserver, the FBI, and a security company 
named CrowdStrike took over the peer to peer C2 infrastructure through redirection to sinkholes.  
This resulted in a “100%” takedown of the C2 infrastructure, and also included collaboration with 
Spanish authorities to arrest Pyotr Levahov, a Russian reported to be behind a massive empire of 
spam-based malware.207  Kehilos also helps show how variants of the same piece of malware and 
non-codified naming conventions may lead to confusion and repeated work across the provisioning 
patchwork. 
 In 2012 another security nonprofit named the Honeypot Project attempted a sinkhole 
operation of the the Kehilos .B/Hux malware.  They were joined by the private company actors, 
Dell SecureWorks, CrowdStrike, and Kaspersky.  This is one of the “failed” attempts to disable 
Kehilos referenced above.  However, if the information provided by Honeynet regarding the effort 
on their website and, published contemporaneously with the 2012 effort, is to be believed the 
takedown was quite successful.  That stands in contrast Shadowserver’s analysis and published 
after the 2017 takedown of subsequent Kehilos variants working with the FBI.208  Why?  As an 
indication of practice, that question points to an inherent problem of networked provisioning 
mechanisms, often coordination does not breed standardization in terms of what success or failure 
consist of and in terms of distinguishing amongst malware, variants of that malware, and new or 
wholly different malware.  An analysis of a small set of malware naming and identification across 
various industry entities/products by cybersecurity firm OPSWAT concluded “…we can infer that 
the naming conventions seem to lack consistency across different anti-malware vendors - there 
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isn't even consistency in the inconsistency…”209  As early as 2012 analysts such as Ditrrich 
identified the confusion surrounding naming as a factor that hinders greater collaboration and 
awareness.210 
 The Kehilos experience preceded an effort by the Honeynet Project to promote a “code of 
conduct” for takedown operations.  As mentioned previously, these operations had sometimes 
existed in legal “gray space” when undertaken by private actors either without or with little public 
legal support and the involvement of law enforcement.  Additionally, in 2007 the takedown of the 
McColo/Szrizbi severs proved that such operations can have unintended consequences.  That 
takedown effort stemmed from journalistic sources providing information to the ISP which hosted 
the McColo Corporation’s webhosting services.  The ISP made the decision to “pull the plug” 
which affected not only the bad actors using McColo’s services to send out spam and malware, 
but also legitimate users of the service.211  In another incident in 2008, German researchers 
attempted to disrupt the operations of the Storm botnet by using a technique called “poisoning,” 
which is an active technique of changing the destination of the botnet’s C2 requests and requires 
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making changes on victim’s computer, which may occur without their permission or knowledge.212 
The Honeynet Project’s code of conduct was further supported by Shadowserver, they; based their 
code of conduct on a DHS effort that resulted in the Menlo Report:  Ethical Principles Guiding 
Information and Communication Technology Research213.  The Menlo Report tried to offer a set 
of guiding principles on which to base ethical execution of research within the information 
sciences and computing fields.  The report was used as the basis to then generate a code of conduct 
for takedown efforts within the information security community.  The code of conduct’s overall 
effect and penetration beyond discussion generated from its release in 2012 is debatable, however 
it offers a clear indication of practice and identifies an important seam that has been referenced 
throughout this work.  That seam is between the academic/research community of practice and the 
security community of practice.  In many cases that seam is obviously minor, in that the two 
communities overlap and often help enable security provisioning.  In the case of the code of 
conduct, a specific individual can be identified as the (or, perhaps a) node connecting the two 
communities, that being Dave Dittrich whom is both an academic researcher and security 
practitioner as he is also part of the Honeynet Project non-profit.214   
 In general, coordination efforts have increased in complexity and occupied longer timelines 
as various legal instruments, tactics and techniques have been developed, institutionalized and 
evolved.215  As a general statement, reviewing the data and debates surrounding the presented 
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takedown/ provisioning activities seems to confirm the most successful efforts involve broad based 
constituencies and partnership between public and private entities and across international lines.  
This would make sense if thought about not as criminal activity confined to a technological space, 
but as criminal activity that has people at the root.  Successful security provisioning across these 
cases involves technical solutions to interdict and shut down C2 of the malware and botnets, but it 
also requires that law enforcement arrest individuals and courts sanction and sentence those 
individuals to stop the issue at its root.  The manner in which those various elements have mixed 
and the stage of the process in which various elements begin their involvement has changed.  
Generally, it can be stated that while public elements such a law enforcement have always been 
present, there is a general shift toward involving public constituencies earlier as the operations 
have matured and evolved to become more and more complex.  Clear indicators of practice have 
emerged subsequent to the Conficker experience.  Efforts such as the code of conduct that sought 
to codify behavior across the community is evidence of the evolving practice of takedowns.  
Clearly, agencies such as the US DOJ, and equivalents in countries such as the UK, the 
Netherlands, and many others have become ever more sophisticated and proactive within the area 
of takedowns as well.  This is another clear indicator of an evolving community of practice that 
has grown to include constituencies outside of computational security professionals embedded 
within Internet relevant companies and academia.   
 In 2016 Shadowserver took part in a multinational effort to mitigate the Avalanche 
malware.  Avalanche was not a botnet, but a “content delivery service” that allowed multiple 
botnets and malware to be controlled and sold for a number of criminal purposes.  Members of 
Shadowserver worked as part of a technical subgroup within the collaborative effort to build an 




C&C functions over an 18 month period.216  A blog entry on Shadowsever’s website described “a 
mammoth effort involving complex international coordination, with the final operational take 
down being conducted from Europol/EC3’s Headquarters over the 3 days.”217  The operation 
affected more than 20 malware families operating in 30 countries and US states while impacting 
over 60 domain name registries worldwide.  The blog entry specifies that the Avalanche takedown 
“required unprecedent levels of international partnership.”218  Five individuals were arrested, 37 
different premises were searched in a coordinated worldwide effort, 39 servers were sized while 
221 were taken offline.  IP addresses representing over 180 countries were reportedly victimized, 
and Shadowserver blocked or redirected over 800,000 domains falling within over 60 top level 
domains (.com, .biz, .us, etc.).219 Comparing the Avalanche takedown to the Conficker takedown 
is useful, in that one can easily see the complexity that such operations have taken on, but at same 
time, basic elements of collaboration have remained surprisingly similar.  Indications of practice 
include the sheer scale of coordination, which clearly incorporated multiple entities working 
transnationally, and unlike Conficker, substantial State support across a number of countries’ law 
enforcement and judicial elements.  This is a clear substantiation of one of this dissertation’s 
central claims:  Security provisioning related to large-scale problems on /for the Internet is carried 
out by a community of practice that has evolved through significant events and represents a unique 
culture of social practice. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation began with an effort to help define the domain of analysis in a manner that 
could facilitate investigation from the perspective of IR Security Studies.  The ICIRS model draws 
upon understandings of security as conceived by computing and information security disciplines 
that it combines with an understanding of levels of analysis drawn from IR theory.  Using the 
ICIRS model as a heuristic, the foundational ideas of agency, structure, identity, and power across 
the modern information security space can all be systematically explored.  
Chapter two of this dissertation establishes the idea that social practice characterizes the 
manner that networks of individuals and entities, organize collaborate, and coordinate to address 
large-scale security concerns on and for the Internet.  These networks form within and around an 
information security community of practice that has arisen as consequence of the early Internet’s 
structure and due to the social connections maintained amongst individuals and entities.  In order 
to substantiate this claim, this dissertation reviews the historical context within which security 
provisioning on and for the Internet has evolved, bookended by two canonical cases, the Morris 
Worm incident and the Conficker botnet.  It was shown that the types of collaboration enabled 
through early mailing lists helped establish a culture and mechanism of security provisioning that 
has remained remarkably similar through time.  Early incidents made use of security aware 
individuals that had tremendous operational responsibility across the nascent and growing Internet.  
As time went on, the scale of threat, and the pace with which emergent threats spread increased, a 




Chapter four led the reader through two separate types of security provisioning to help 
understand the modern provisioning environment that has grown complex due the Internet’s 
explosive growth, the professionalization across the security community, and the proliferation of 
seams across the security patchwork.  In the BGP routing case, evidence showed how network 
engineers embedded within the logical layer of the Internet maintain social connections to help 
recognize and remediate routing errors born of either mistake or malfeasance.  The chapter then 
turned to an understanding of the post-Conficker world of botnet remediation.  The Mariposa 
botnet shows how minor seams enable takedown operations and major seams, like that between 
Defence Intelligence and the RCMP can hinder collaboration.  Additionally, chapter four discussed 
the relative frequency of takedown efforts across 12 years, and the evolution of various dynamics 
involved in the effort.  
The reader was introduced to the Internet OPSEC community of practice, the organization 
ISOI provides an example of the closely knitted and highly vetted trust groups that have arisen 
around the issue of security substantiating a concept of identity amongst that constituency.  The 
chapter ended by detailing the Avalanche takedown that involved public and private constituents 
coordinating and collaborating across 60 countries helping show the maturation of a community 
of practice that has evolved from adhoc problem solving on the nascent Internet since the Morris 
Worm and into an institutionalized and robust community.  The following sections will offer some 
concluding thoughts considering the breadth of this dissertation. 
5.1 Security as Practice and Power 
In November 2014 Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) experienced a “wiper” attack that 




reportedly attributed to the DPRK, which was confirmed by the US Government when the 
Justice Department issued indictments of North Korean citizens for, amongst other things, the 
Sony incident.220  However, before the 2018 indictment, various non-governmental entities 
conducted their own investigations.  One was Novetta Threat Research.  On a website set up 
to distribute their report findings, the following appears.  
“Operation Blockbuster was spearheaded by Novetta’s Threat Research and 
Interdiction Group (TRIG), working in close partnership with a group of trusted 
experts from cybersecurity, antivirus and malware protection, intelligence and 
research firms. The cross-industry partnership and the scope of the operation’s 
reach signify a new security role and posture for private industry. The Lazarus 
Group activity shows the cyber landscape has evolved. The Novetta-led team 
demonstrates industry can be a highly agile, capable and effective force in 
tracking and interdicting global cyber crime.”221 
 
The release of private reports such as the one detailing Operation Blockbuster help shape 
the larger public debates surrounding response and responsibility for incidents such as the hacking 
of SPE.  They also provide insight into seams important to the analysis of such incidents.  Outside 
of the public/private seam, identified above throughout several cases, there exists important seams 
within the private cybersecurity patchwork.  Authors of Novetta’s report write, “Novetta believes 
that these efforts can help cause significant disruption and raise operating costs for adversaries…” 
and goes on to say, “It is our hope private industry will not only continue to illuminate various 
threat actors’ toolsets and operations, but also work with other industry partners and law 
enforcement agencies as able to affect positive change on the safe of network environments 
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worldwide.”222  The invocation of language that echoes traditional concepts of international 
deterrence and dissuasion (i.e. “raise the costs”) within the context of private actor investigation 
and mitigation of state sponsored cyber malware raises important questions of command, control, 
and communication not only across public/private seams, but also between private entities.   
The authors of the Novetta report appropriately caveat their work as being valid only within 
the scope represented in the malware samples they have collected from public sources and private 
partners, but also forcefully argue that their attribution to North Korea as the perpetrator is correct 
and confirmed by the US Government’s own findings as evidenced by the indictments issues.  
Novetta’s work is a clear acknowledgement, on their part, that they believe as private actors, they 
possess a dimension of power to effect security change on/for the Internet.  In fact, many of the 
cases studied within this dissertation, beginning with the Morris Worm through various botnet 
takedowns and BGP routing errors confirms that private actors embedded within the functional 
portions of the Internet’s structure are uniquely situated to recognize emergent threats.  Microsoft’s 
leveraging of the legal system to seize control of domains proved, they too, believed they possess 
a dimension of power and sought to use it.  Admittedly Microsoft has a sound business case for 
securing the Internet for its own products, but in doing so it is also acting as a de facto deputy on 
behalf of all Internet users.   
Without a doubt, governments and law enforcement play a role as well, but just as agency 
within this space is described as distributed, so must power be thought of as spread across a larger 
constituency than IR Security theory has traditionally considered.  One might observe, however, 
that as traversing the summary table of takedown operations in chapter four, there does seem to be 
                                                          




an increasing presence of law enforcement partners within the cohort of collaborators on any given 
provisioning activity.  In fact, previous authors and analysts have asserted that hierarchies are 
being established over the previously networked nature of security provisioning present on the 
Internet.223  This dissertation doesn’t deny that observation, but it does temper the idea that 
hierarchies are replacing networked provisioning or that hybrids of the two systems are becoming 
prevalent.  Going back to the Morris Worm, government participation both through law 
enforcement action and judicial court proceedings have been a regular feature and outcome of 
many of these cases.  Certainly, as evidenced by Conficker and several “gray space” botnet 
takedowns, exclusive private networked actor coordination is featured.  But rather than making a 
sweeping statement that hierarchies are replacing networked provisioning, it is more accurate to 
speak of a routinization of the law enforcement and court proceedings woven into and coming 
after various types of provisioning activities.  Botnet takedowns, particularly, seem to have found 
an institutionalized pattern of activity that begins with the security community of practice deciding 
that a specific piece of malware or botnet had become large and problematic enough to be 
addressed forming public/private partnerships to address the issue.  Many times, these operations 
take months or even, as discussed in previous chapters, years to form, evolve, and then be executed. 
5.1.1 Its networks all the way down… 
The debate of networks vs hierarchies is at its heart, one of abstraction.  However as the 
above alludes, the debate is perhaps less about a hard divide between the two and more about 
defining the terms of what consists of hierarchy and what is networked.  Without a doubt, public 
agencies and national governments are becoming increasingly involved in phases of the Internet 
                                                          




security process, but instead of seeing this as a creeping hierarchy happening at the expense of 
once networked activity, it may be more useful to understand how public constituencies fit into 
the security provisioning network and cause rearrangement of the nodes and relationships while 
still remaining ‘networked’.  Stated simply, its “networks all the way down.”  It was noted earlier 
in this dissertation that networks are a metaphor du jour.  This is especially true when analyzing 
social relations.  The Internet security space is, perhaps surprisingly, no exception.  This 
dissertation has shown that the Internet’s early structure has had lasting effects on the way security 
must be pursued, this is not just a technical or exclusively a technological issue. It’s a social one.   
This has been true since the Morris Worm, an incident that the was only recognized and 
remediated due to collaboration between individuals via electronic mail, phone, and in-person 
communication and information exchange to align goals and intentions while coming to common 
conceptions of what the problem was.  This general process has been continually repeated again 
and again in the emergence of larger and faster spreading threats.  Security within a space 
characterized as ‘networked’ ultimately involves social connection between increasingly 
specialized human actors which breeds a community of practice.  That community is an important 
constituency that should factor into analysis of the space, in no small part, because their ability to 
recognize emerging threats and act first to remediate them, making them powerful within this 
evermore important segment of the modern world.   
One insight that can highlighted from this dissertation is the importance in recognizing that 
each node within a provisioning network is embedded within a context of its own.  Individuals 
may be part of a “provisioning network” but they are also embedded within other networks, 
whether it is the company they work for or groups they associate with.  Those connections matter 




any given problem as it arises.  Put another way, members of the CWG represented a network 
passing information and coordinating with each other, but their ability to be useful is derived from 
the context they are already embedded within.  While botnets, as a threat vector, have now become 
a routine target of law enforcement and international collaboration, the unforeseen, advanced, and 
wholly new threat, when it debuts, will first be recognized by elements of the Internet’s security 
focused community of practice. 
5.2 Lessons for Policy Makers 
Communities of practice literature originated, partially, to understand living curriculum 
environments in which apprentices learned their trade.  The practice of such trades encompasses 
much more than rote knowledge, and includes subtle worldviews and understanding of how to 
access resources and participate as a member of a community.  Similarly, the community of 
practice arising around the need to recognize and remediate threats on/for the Internet represents 
a pool of specialized knowledge, talent, and resources drawn from individuals and entities 
embedded within functional pieces of the Internet’s structure.  This includes the functional pieces 
encompassed within the logical layer of the ICIRS model, and increasingly, within specialized 
security focused companies like Novetta and nonprofit entities like Shadowserver, ISOI, and many 
others.  Pockets of that community are also represented within large companies like Microsoft and 
Cisco, each with their own business reasons necessitating a functional and stable Internet.   
Security, once an afterthought, now represents a central concern, which in and of itself 
should come as no surprise.  However, what is the proper role of the State?  Are there trade-offs 
in allowing networked methods to be replaced with centralized hierarchies directed by State 




comes up with solutions to spreading criminal activity such as researchers developing “sinkholing” 
techniques, but on the other hand bereft of strong law enforcement and judicial action, those 
attempts proved less effective in the long term and carried with them unintended consequences.  
Consider, for example, the McColo, Grum, and Bamital takedowns.  When broad constituencies 
were built around the operations, better success was had.  The lesson for policy makers is that the 
security community of practice needs to be engaged early in the threat recognition phase in order 
to incorporate their agile problem-solving against emergent threats into established legal 
understandings in situ, not after the fact.  The community of practice acts as “sensors” embedded 
within the Internet that can recognize threats as they emerge, often they too are “first movers” 
helping initiate security provisioning activities that can often become templates for future activity.  
Previous analysis that identified a central tension between secrecy and openness within the 
security community is correct.224  This tension is obvious when researching close knit trust groups 
like ISOI and others that operate, in part, utilizing Ops-Trust among other ways of collaboration 
and coordination such as conferences.  On one hand, the community has an innate need for security 
but the networked nature of security provisioning across the community benefits from open 
coordination, collaboration, and information exchange.  This is an issue across all levels of analysis 
within the ICIRS model, information sharing is often discussed as ideal, but hindered by the 
economic disincentives (in terms of stock share price, reputational harm, and legal recourse of 
victims affected) guaranteed by open disclosure of security breaches.  Participants at ISOI 
explained when asked, the various companies and institutions they represented have misgivings 
about the frank and open dialogue taking place at ISOI conferences.  Some theorized if their upper 
management knew the extent of the information exchange that they engage in across the vetted 
                                                          




and trusted community, their upper management would be furious.225  Those same individuals are, 
adamant that such interaction is wholly necessary for them to be effective in their security focused 
positions.226  For policymakers, this presents a unique institutional design problem, one that 
encompasses questions of political economy, public interest, legal liability among various other 
dimensions — as well as security.   
Some direction can be taken from the community of practice perspective, which points to 
the fact that information sharing in and of itself won’t necessarily lead to the formation of robust 
and functional remediation mechanisms.  Communities of practice are born of shared experience 
that forces coordination through problem solving.  Thereby, top down mandates to share 
information may fall flat if those efforts aren’t augmented by opportunities for practitioners to 
interface and build working multi-dimensional relationships such those engendered by FIRST, 
ISOI, and other institutions.  The BGP routing case alludes to this issue, which highlighted the fact 
that maintaining personal connections across the industry is an important way to remediate 
problems.  Multiple cases of botnet and malware remediation highlighted within this work show 
how individuals reached out through various mechanisms to coordinate and collaborate with others 
within what was once a burgeoning but is now a robust community of security practitioners.  
Additionally, history of botnet takedowns highlights the way formal state mechanisms need time 
to evolve in response to emerging areas of threats.  How does law enforcement learn about a new 
threat? How do entities like the FBI go from being a reactive element engaged later in the process 
of remediation (not involved in great measure with Conficker during the CWG’s most active 
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phases) to being a proactive investigatory entity directing takedown activities (Avalanche, Khelios, 
GameOver Zeus, etc.) and being involved in all phases of the process?  The answer is that the 
practice of takedowns had to be socialized and elements of the Internet’s security community of 
practice had to first interact with, and become embedded within, entities such as the FBI.  That 
process happens bit by bit as that community itself grapples with understanding, problematizing, 
and responding to the evolving threat-scape.   
Within this work, when two constituencies come into contact and must exchange 
information for the purpose of coordination and cooperation, the interface is deemed a “seam”.  
From the perspective of policy makers and regarding the fostering of a community of practice, 
seams matter.  While only two types of seams are identified within this work, minor or major, the 
former that enables action and the latter that inhibits it, seams themselves are dynamic and help 
identify an important facet/mechanism for consideration by policymakers.  How should 
connections between groups be architected in order to reap the benefits of a minor seam 
arrangement and mitigate against the detriments of a major seam arrangement?  Both the Conficker 
and Mariposa cases show how the ad-hoc nature of coordination in place since the days of Morris 
Worm has matured into the establishment of formalized “Working Groups” stood up around a 
specific threat or problem, in both cases membership largely followed from prior relationships 
amongst participants.  Similarly, as both scale and pace of future threats increase, such working 
groups will need to be stood up around wholly different problems that may go far beyond botnets 
in terms of impact.   
While numerous efforts across the ICIRS levels of analysis have manifested to address 
coordination, cooperation, and information sharing, the evidence presented seems to indicate 




As such, there may be utility in national level exercises that mobilize a larger segment of public, 
private, and academic resources than current initiatives that often take place within narrow industry 
and trade segments (Energy, Banking, etc.) among public and/or private constituencies.  Doing so 
may help establish working relationships necessary for best navigating seams and reducing major 
ones to minor ones.  
5.3 Future Work 
 The lens of practice has further potential to help IR theorists interrogate and make sense of 
the unique mixture of structure and agency presented by the Internet as a conceptual space.  
Describing what “cyberspace” consists is problematic for IR security scholars.  The ICIRS model 
combined with the lens of practice shows a way out of the morass, allowing for a more systematic 
exploration that integrates an understanding of information security with levels of analysis meant 
to segment analysis of social dynamics.  This holds promise for further exploration of the space 
using social science theories and methodologies at each level of analysis.  There are several areas 
that this dissertation did not address, but should be pursued in future work.  The first is, clearly, 
that transnational provisioning of security by the information security community of practice needs 
to be explored from the perspective of political economy.   
Internet Security is a tremendous growth field and industry.  The economic dimension is 
required to think about the practice of security.  The discussion in chapter four of the Rustock 
takedown hints at various implications of this.  On one hand, the threat itself often has economic 
incentives that explain criminal pursuit of such activities.  Spam email that advertises any number 
of products, many of which are fraudulent or illicit, is a canonical example.  Indeed, as mentioned 




giving rise to a large criminal enterprise.  But on the defensive side of the equation, money plays 
a role as well.  Companies like FireEye exist to market their security solutions, and as evidenced 
by their own employees’ presentation, they may pick targets based on how easily they can measure 
the outcome and on visibility of their work.  That means there are economic incentives and 
disincentives for companies like FireEye when deciding which targets to pursue and when.   
More work needs to be done to integrate analysis of international security provisioning 
on/for the Internet through the lens of political economy as conceived by IR scholars.  Not only at 
the firm level, but at the State level of analysis. Take for example the case of allofmp3.com.  In 
2006, the US based part of its protest over Russia’s desire to join the WTO on the continued 
operation of allofmp3.com from Russian servers.227  The website sold illegal copies of music, 
including many songs and whole albums with copyrights held in the US, for cut-rate prices far 
below market value and without paid royalties to content creators.  The dispute may have forced 
Russia to pass newer copyright protections that forced allofmp3 to shut down, likely as a condition 
to their accession into the WTO.  While that anecdote is centered on intellectual property rights, it 
highlights the centrality of the Internet within global commerce and its importance at the highest 
levels of State to State economic diplomacy.  Similarly, issues of security will become increasingly 
tied to the political economy of international machinations.   
Currently, the US and China are locked in a standoff centered on the Chinese company 
Huawei’s access to American and Western markets for their enterprise level switching equipment 
and next generation cellular technology.  The US contends Huawei is an instrument of China’s 
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military and intelligence apparatus and as such cannot be trusted to provide foundational Internet 
infrastructure to the US government, their allies, and important adjacent defense industries.228  
While that is, in and of itself, worthy of study, the question for the subject matter of this dissertation 
is how such high-level debates affect the transnational peer groups such as those among network 
engineers and information security professionals that traditionally have to coordinate in the face 
of largescale threats?  Multiple cases detailed above highlight coordination by US private and 
public actors and China’s domain name registrar to redirect illicit traffic toward sinkholes crippling 
the C&C infrastructure of malware and botnets.  Can such coordination survive antagonistic 
relationships mediated through not only State actors, firms such as Cisco (a US based Huawei 
competitor), Huawei itself, academic, and private members of the cybersecurity patchwork along 
with market derived incentives and disincentives?  Answering those questions necessitates 
bringing the theoretical lens of political economy and associated methodologies to bear on the 
Internet security provisioning space. 
5.4 Complex Things Fail in Complex Ways 
The Internet is a system of systems.  It is a complex architecture inexorably entwined with 
social systems, creating a sum of parts that is complicated.  The thing about complex systems is– 
they can fail in complex ways.  The Internet isn’t the first complex system of connectivity built by 
humankind that diffuses knowledge and ideas, spreads commerce and creates wealth, all while 
ushering in new risks.  Take, for example, the largest contiguous land empire in human history, 
the Mongol Empire.  At its largest, the Mongol Empire encompassed approximately 9,300,000 
square miles stretching from Eastern Europe to the Sea of Japan while also encompassing parts of 
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Siberia, the Middle East, and southward into the Indian subcontinent. The Empire became the 
administrative authority securing trade connections between the Western and the Eastern World. 
The period subsequent to Genghis Khan’s death, but before the Empire began its decline, is 
known as Pax Mongolica.  The known world was surprisingly interconnected and economically 
interdependent.229  The Mongol method of rule was pragmatic and often took local culture and 
tradition seriously striving to adapt to local conditions, albeit initial rule was established through 
military conquest.  The Mongols reined in corruption, controlled bribes and lawlessness, which 
allowed trade and business to flourish.  This system of trade routes called the Silk Road, was like 
the Internet, a complex system of interconnection.  News could spread wider and faster than ever 
before and the Empire was administered due, in no small part, to the system of garrisons the 
Mongols created.  An insatiable appetite to continuously grow the Empire meant the Horde was 
always riding, bringing with them technologies absorbed though conquest, new ideas, spices, 
cultural goods –and even disease.  Even after Genghis Khan’s death, the Mongol empire grew, and 
though his descendants eventually split the Empire into four administrative regions controlled by 
separate Khans –all descendants of the Great Khan himself through his sons- the Empire thrived 
due to this interconnected system of systems.230   
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The Mongol Empire did not, however, last into perpetuity.  Infighting and competing spheres 
of power helped weaken the Empire’s cohesiveness, but beyond that and according to modern 
historians, there was another reason the Empire was lost to time:  The Black Plague.  The Plague 
originated in central Asia and spread via the fleas present on the backs of rats on ships, horses, and 
camels as they moved though the Empire and beyond.  Like the evolving computer-based viruses 
of modernity, the Plague was ever faster spreading and unstoppable.231  Regions of the world were 
decimated.  But why did the Plague contribute to the decline of the Mongol Empire?  The answer 
lies with how locales responded.  It varied across regions, but local laws began to regulate all 
manner of activity thought to contribute to the spread of the disease.  Whole ethnicities faced 
condemnation and death, not due to the plague, but due to panic that they were responsible for the 
plague due their affiliation with trade.  Jewish peoples were put to death in various parts of the 
world including Italy and other European countries, Muslims were killed as it was thought they 
brought the plague with them from the East.  Laws were enacted to ban the importation of cloth 
thought to carry the plague, outlaw the trade of meat not due to any understood direct connection, 
but because it was associated with “smell of death”.232  According to some sources, whole houses 
were condemned to be burned with the occupants inside once plague was identified.  If a foreign 
visitor fell ill, those they visited might be burned to death in order to stop the disease from 
spreading despite no symptoms being identified amongst the incidentally condemned.  The result 
of these local responses was for parts of the Empire to turn inward.  The plague response cut off 
communication, shut down trade, and halted the cultural diffusion through travel all of which 
characterized Pax Mongolica.  The secondary and tertiary effects of plague induced madness were 
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overwhelming.  The great system of systems known as the Silk Road faltered and could not 
recover.233  The response to the black plague helped doom the Mongol Empire.  Local responses 
to systemic problems can generate negative systemic effects, especially in the absence of 
coordination amongst localities.  Threat recognition and threat response is important within a 
complex system of systems.  Complex things fail in complex ways. 
This dissertation, similarly, seeks to understand the manner that large-scale threats are 
recognized and remediated on and for another system of systems, the Internet.  The application of 
the ICIRS model helps understand the issue of security as it intersects with various levels of social 
order across the systems that underlie the Internet and allows it to function, bounding the concept 
and helping clarify the confusing terminology of cybersecurity.  Further, this dissertation shows 
that a community of practice has arisen due to the way the Internet was initially structured, and 
that community has grown robust as security has become professionalized and seams have 
multiplied as the Internet has grown.  As new threats have emerged, ever larger in scale and ever 
faster in propagation, the community of practice has engaged in the process of threat recognition 
and problem-solving.  That community will become ever more central in maintaining the Internet’s 
stability and is thereby a powerful constituency deserving of study and explication. 
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